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AND HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  AND NBER 
The  Six  Major  Puzzles  in 
International  Macroeconomics: 
Is  There  a  Common  Cause? 
1. Introduction 
International macroeconomics  is a field replete with truly perplexing puz- 
zles,  and we  generally  have  five to ten (or more) alternative  answers  to 
each of them.  These  answers  are typically very clever but far from thor- 
oughly  convincing,  and so the puzzles  remain.  Why do people  seem  to 
have such a strong preference  for consumption  of their home  goods  (the 
home-bias-in-trade  puzzle)?  Why  do  observed  OECD  current-account 
imbalances  tend  to be so small relative  to saving  and investment  when 
measured  over  any  sustained  period  (the  Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle)? 
Why do home  investors  overwhelmingly  prefer to hold home  equity as- 
sets  (the  home-bias  portfolio  puzzle)?  Why  isn't  consumption  more 
highly  correlated across OECD countries  (the consumption  correlations 
puzzle)?  How is it possible  that the half-life of real exchange-rate innova- 
tions  can be  three  to four years  (the purchasing-power-parity  puzzle)? 
Why are exchange  rates so volatile  and so apparently disconnected  from 
fundamentals  [the exchange-rate  disconnect  puzzle,  of which the Meese- 
Rogoff (1983) forecasting puzzle  and the Baxter-Stockman  (1989) neutral- 
ity-of-exchange-rate-regime  puzzle  are manifestations]? 
What  we  attempt  to  do  in  this  paper  is  to  offer  a unified  basis  for 
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understanding  all of these  puzzles,  in which  the key friction is a (signifi- 
cant but  plausible)  level  of  international  trade  costs  in goods markets. 
These  trade costs  may include  transport costs  but also  tariffs, nontariff 
barriers, and possibly  other broader factors that impede  trade. 
We do not pretend  to be the first to make this connection.  In a funda- 
mental  contribution  to the literature on international  trade and finance, 
Samuelson  (1954) argued  that the  existence  of an international  transfer 
problem  depends  critically on whether  there is a home  bias in consump- 
tion,  and he  showed  explicitly  how  a home  bias could be derived  from 
transport costs.1 In subsequent  research, however,  Samuelson's  straight- 
forward  approach  has  generally  been  abandoned  in  favor  of  a  more 
stylized  paradigm  based  on breaking  up  a country's  products  into  two 
dichotomous  categories,  traded  and nontraded  goods.2  The analysis  of 
the  present  paper  suggests  that for many  purposes,  this  dichotomous 
grouping  is far less  helpful  than the natural alternative  of simply  intro- 
ducing  trade costs. 
Especially  in our treatment of capital-market anomalies,  the approach 
in  this  paper  differs  from  the  one  that  is  conventionally  taken  in  the 
literature. Typically, an author chooses  from a menu  of plausible  capital- 
market imperfections  the one best  suited  to explain  a particular puzzle. 
We do not deny  the importance  of a variety  of imperfections  peculiar to 
international  asset markets. Our goal here,  however,  is to show  how  far 
one  can go in elucidating  major empirical  riddles  without  appealing  to 
intrinsically  international  capital-market imperfections.  Remarkably, we 
find  that once  one  allows  for trade costs  in goods markets,  many  of the 
main empirical objections to the canonical models  of international macro- 
economics  disappear.  Our  approach,  which  is based  on  a very  simple 
stylized  model,  seems  to be particularly successful  in resolving  the real- 
side quantity puzzles.  To explain adequately  the various pricing puzzles, 
we would  need  to develop  a much richer framework featuring imperfect 
1. Obstfeld  and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 4) embed  trade costs in a version  of the Dornbusch- 
Fischer-Samuelson  (1977) Ricardian model and show  that Samuelson's  transfer-problem 
analysis  can  be  extended  to  a modern  dynamic  setting.  See  Krugman  (1991) on  the 
relevance  of  the  transfer  problem  to  contemporary  debates  in  international  macro- 
economics. 
2. A notable  exception  is Backus, Kehoe,  and Kydland  (1992), who  find that their approxi- 
mate  method  for  incorporating  small  trade  costs  does  not  resolve  the  consumption 
correlations puzzle  in a calibrated one-good  global real-business-cycle  model.  Another  is 
Dumas  (1992), who  looks  at a dynamic,  stochastic,  one-good  open economy  model  with 
transport  costs  and  explores  a number  of issues,  including  the  forward  exchange-rate 
premium.  His work is theoretical and qualitative,  however,  and he does  not calibrate his 
model's  empirical  implications  for the various  puzzles  we  look at here.  Also,  our main 
points  in this paper  really require an extension  to the multigood  case.  In a more recent 
contribution,  Ravn  and  Mazzenga  (1999) examine  further  the  business-cycle  implica- 
tions of transport costs  in a variant of the Backus-Kehoe-Kydland  model. The  Six  Major  Puzzles  in International  Macroeconomics  *  341 
competition  plus  sticky prices  and/or wages,  as in the extensive  recent 
literature  on  the  "new  open-economy  macroeconomics."  Although  we 
do not present  such  a model  here,  we  do demonstrate  why  trade costs 
must constitute  an essential  element,  implicitly if not explicitly. 
The  first  puzzle  we  address  is  the  home-bias-in-trade  puzzle  (Mc- 
Callum,  1995), which,  as we have already noted,  is closely  related to the 
classic  transfer  problem.  Following  Wei  (1998)  and  Evans  (1999),  we 
discuss  how  empirically plausible  trade costs,  combined  with fairly stan- 
dard estimates  of elasticities  of substitution  across imports  and exports, 
can explain  much of the puzzle. 
Having established  the trade friction at the core of our analysis, we next 
turn to one  of the  most  robust  and  intractable puzzles  in international 
finance,  the  Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle.  We  show  that  trade  costs  can 
create a wedge  between  the effective real interest rates faced by borrowers 
and lenders.  In our model,  the effect is highly nonlinear, manifesting  itself 
strongly  only  when  current-account  imbalances  become  very  large.  We 
argue that it is precisely  such incipient  real-interest-rate effects that keep 
observed  current-account imbalances within a modest  range. Though we 
rely primarily on the theoretical force of the argument, we do demonstrate 
empirically that current-account-deficit  countries tend to have higher real 
interest  rates, as our model  predicts. 
Next,  we  show  that the  same  approach  can simply  and elegantly  ex- 
plain the widely  discussed  home bias in equity holdings  (or, more gener- 
ally, in  overall  asset  positions).  The  following  section  covers  the  con- 
sumption  correlations  puzzle,  which  is closely  related to the preceding 
three,  so it is not  surprising  our same  approach  again  applies.  We also 
briefly address  other related puzzles. 
We largely  ignore nominal  rigidities  in our discussion  of the first four 
puzzles,  because  our  main  argument  does  not  depend  upon  having 
them.  But as we  turn to our last two  puzzles-the  purchasing-power- 
parity  puzzle  and  the  exchange-rate  disconnect  puzzle-we  obviously 
must  think  about  adding  other  ingredients,  in  the  form  of  imperfect 
competition  and some  degree  of price or wage  rigidity. We nevertheless 
argue  that trade costs  in output  markets  must  be  an essential  ingredi- 
ent  in resolving  these  puzzles  as well.  The final section  concludes  and 
also  evaluates  our  results  in  the  light  of  long-term  trends  in  world 
transport costs. 
2.  The  Puzzle  of  Home  Bias  in Trade  (Puzzle  1) 
The starting point for all the puzzles  we examine is the growing  evidence 
that international goods markets appear to be far more segmented  than is 342 *  OBSTFELD  & ROGOFF 
commonly  supposed.  Perhaps the most dramatic suggestion  of segmenta- 
tion stems  from the work of McCallum (1995). Using  a simple  Tinbergen 
(1962) gravity  model  of trade that controls  for distance,  trading-partner 
sizes,  and a small number  of other factors,  McCallum found  that trade 
among  individual  Canadian  provinces  was  twenty times  greater  than 
trade between  individual  Canadian provinces  and individual  U.S. states, 
a surprisingly  high differential. It is true that the subsequent  literature has 
both tempered McCallum's estimates and challenged  their interpretation. 
McCallum's calculations  were based on the year 1988, still at the dawn of 
the  U.S.-Canada  free-trade  agreement,  and  before  trade patterns  had 
time to adjust fully. Using data for 1993-1996,  Helliwell  (1998) found  that 
the unexplained  home  bias had fallen to a factor of 12, which  remains  a 
surprisingly  large number.  Though  intracountry trade data are available 
only for Canada and the United  States,  Wei (1998) and Evans (1999) use 
indirect  methods  to test  home  bias for other  OECD country  pairs.  Wei 
suggests  that the  average  bias may be as low  as 2.5,  while  Evans finds 
values  intermediate  between  Wei's and Helliwell's.3  Van Wincoop  (2000) 
argues that even though  McCallum controls for state and province  size in 
his  gravity equation,  his  trade-diversion  measure  gives  an exaggerated 
impression  of home bias in global trade because it calculates the bias from 
the perspective  of the small country, Canada,  rather than from the per- 
spective  of the large country, the United States.4 Overall, a balanced inter- 
pretation of the literature is that countries do exhibit a considerable degree 
of home bias in trade, but the bias is not as extreme as McCallum's original 
estimates  suggested. 
But if there  is still  a significant  degree  of home  bias  in international 
trade,  how  can we  explain  it? Clearly, international  trade does  involve 
added  border costs  such as tariffs, nontariff barriers, and exchange-rate 
risk (and it is also possible  that domestic  transportation  costs  are lower 
due to greater coordination  problems  in constructing  international  trans- 
portation networks).  Do these  border costs need  to be implausibly  large 
to generate  observed  home bias, even  in the more modest  range of Wei's 
3. Wei (1998) tries to estimate  home  bias indirectly by assuming  that the amount  a country 
imports  from itself  is the  difference  between  total production  and  total exports.  How- 
ever, Wei's 2.5 home bias estimate  could be downward  biased due to his exclusion  of the 
service  sector.  Evans  (1999) uses  data  on  selected  industries  for a number  of  OECD 
countries. 
4. Van Wincoop  (2000) shows  that  McCallum's  measure  of  trade  bias  must  be  carefully 
interpreted  to ascertain the negative  border effect on U.S.-Canada  trade. Because  Can- 
ada's  economy  is so  small  relative to that of the United  States,  a moderate  percentage 
diversion  of U.S.-Canada  trade into  intra-Canada  trade amounts  to a spectacular  per- 
centage  increase  in intra-Canada  trade.  Using  U.S.  interstate  trade data,  van  Wincoop 
estimates  that the  U.S.-Canada  border  reduces  trade between  the two  countries  by at 
most 30%. The  Six Major  Puzzles  in International  Macroeconomics  *  343 
and  Evans'  estimates?  Not  necessarily,  since  what  really matters  is the 
interaction  between  border  costs  and  the  elasticity  of  substitution  be- 
tween  home  and  foreign  goods.  As  this  is  a recurring  theme  in  our 
discussion  of  the  various  quantity  puzzles,  it  is  helpful  to  take  up  a 
simple  illustrative  example. 
2.1 A MODEL  OF THE  INTERACTION  BETWEEN  TRADE  COSTS 
AND THE  PRICE  ELASTICITY  OF DEMAND 
Here,  we  show  how  costs  of international  trade can dramatically skew 
domestic  consumption  in favor of home-produced  goods. 
Consider  an extremely  simple  two-country  endowment  economy,  in 
which  the utility function  of the representative  home  consumer  is given 
by 
\  0/(-1) 
C=  (C(H 10+cr  1)1)  ,  (1) 
where  CH  is home  consumption  of the  home-produced  good  and  CF is 
home  consumption  of  the  foreign-produced  good.  Foreign  agents  are 
assumed  to have  identical  utility  functions  in  C1  and  CF.  Home  agents 
are endowed  with  YH  per capita of the home  good,  and foreign  agents 
are endowed  with  YF. We assume  iceberg shipping  costs  T, so  that  for 
every  unit of home  (foreign) good  shipped  abroad, only  a fraction 1 -  T 
arrives at the foreign  (home)  shore.  Let PH  (PF) be the home  price of the 
home  (foreign) good,  and PH  (PFj)  the corresponding  foreign prices, with 
all prices  measured  in terms of a common  world  monetary  unit.  (Since 
we  are in a flexible-price world here,  it is not important whether  the two 
countries  share a common  currency.) Then,  if markets  are competitive, 
arbitrage implies  that 
PF =  P/(l  -  r),  (2) 
PH=  (1  -  T)P*.  (3) 
Thus,  if p -  PF/PH, and  p*  PF/PH, 
p* = p(l  -  T)2.  (4) 
(We will  maintain  the  assumption  of competitive  markets  through  the 
first four sections,  though  our main points  would  still apply in an imper- 
fectly competitive  setting,  as in our discussion  of puzzles  5 and 6.) 
From the first-order conditions  for utility  maximization  by home  and 
foreign  agents,  we  have 344 *  OBSTFELD  & ROGOFF 
CH  C( 
-P  (p.  (5) 
Cr  C?  F  F 
Combining  (4) and (5) implies 
CH  29C! 
CH(1  -  7)  2C(6) 
CF  CF 
For illustrative  purposes,  consider  the easy  symmetric  case in which 
YH =  YF. Under  that  assumption,  CH/CF =  CF*/CH  and  equation  (6) reduces 
to 
CH  CF  H  = -=(1  -  7)- = p . 
CF  CH 
This  equation  shows  that  the  ratio of  home  (foreign)  expenditure  on 
imports relative to home  (foreign) goods  is 
C-  -  (1  -  Tp)1- 
pCF  CH 
Thus,  for example,  if there were no trade costs  (7 = 0), then pCF/CH =  1. 
If r =  0.25 (a large number just for goods  actually  traded but conserva- 
tive when  applied  to all of GNP) and 0 = 6, then CH/pCF = 4.2. This ratio 
is consistent  with  those  we  observe  for many  OECD countries,  and the 
degree  of home  bias can easily be made  larger by raising 7, raising  0, or 
assuming  that the home  country is a small one  trading with  many  like- 
sized  foreign partners. 
2.2 THE  NONLINEAR  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  TRADE  COSTS 
AND HOME  BIAS  IN TRADE 
The higher trade costs (the closer 7 is to 1), the greater the impact of a 1% 
reduction  in r on home  bias: 
d log(CH/pCF)  = 
d log 7  1 -  T 
For our baseline  case of  r =  0.25 and  0 =  6, the elasticity  of home  bias 
with  respect  to  trade  costs  is  7(0  -  1)/(1  -  r) =  1.67. The  Six Major  Puzzles  in International  Macroeconomics  *  345 
Obviously,  this example  is wildly  oversimplified.  It implicitly assumes 
a common  substitution  elasticity  across any individual  pair of home  and 
foreign goods,  and similarly lumps all goods  together as having  common 
trade costs.  It ignores  the potential  importance  of substitution  between 
domestic  and foreign inputs  in production.  Nevertheless,  it neatly illus- 
trates how  a high  elasticity  of substitution  can explain  a large observed 
home  trade  bias  even  with  low  trade  costs.  What  then  are plausible 
values  for the parameters  r and  0? 
2.3 EMPIRICAL  ESTIMATES  OF 0 
Though  there is a range of estimates  for 0, recent trade studies  typically 
find  values  for  the  elasticity  of  import  demand  with  respect  to  price 
(relative  to the  overall  domestic  consumption  basket)  in the  neighbor- 
hood  of  5 to  6.  Examples  include  Trefler and  Lai (1999), who  present 
panel  estimates  over  1972-1992  for a panel  of 28 industries  in 36 coun- 
tries; their preferred  estimate  is 5.3.  That average  number  reflects esti- 
mated  disaggregated  substitution  elasticities  as high  as 21.4 (for indus- 
trial chemicals)  and 18.9 (for electrical machinery  and electronics) but as 
low  as 1.2 (for printing  and publishing).  Harrigan (1993) looks  at three- 
digit  1983 SITC data for 13 OECD countries  representing  90% of OECD 
output  and finds elasticities  in the range of 5 to 12. 
Recognizing  that much  of trade involves  imperfectly  competitive  in- 
dustries,  one can attempt to infer the value of 0 by looking  at markups of 
price over marginal cost. Using  that approach, Cheung,  Chinn,  and Fujii 
(1999) look  at two-digit  industry  level  data for a range of OECD coun- 
tries, and impute  elasticities  typically  in the range of 3.5 to 4. Hummels 
(1999a) tries to disentangle  the effects  of trade elasticities  from those  of 
substitution  elasticities  within  a cross-section  framework.  Using  linear 
least squares,  he comes  up with  an average markup of 22%, translating 
into a 0 of 5.6,  although  other of his estimates  of 0 are higher.  Finally, in 
their classic article on the demand  for automobiles-including  both  do- 
mestic  and  foreign  makes-Berry,  Levinsohn,  and  Pakes  (1995)  find 
price elasticities  of demand  between  3.1 and 6.4.5 
Of course,  these  studies  refer to goods  actually traded.  As Hummels 
emphasizes,  one would  expect  that elasticities  of substitution  would  be 
higher on average for goods  that are not traded. In this case, an estimate 
5. Studies  of monopoly  markups  in domestic  sales,  while  not necessarily  directly applica- 
ble here, also yield similar estimates  for 0. For example,  Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) 
find a markup for the  United  States of around  20%, corresponding  to  0 =  6. In subse- 
quent discussion,  Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1995) argue that there is great uncertainty 
about actual markups  in U.S.  industry, but favor estimates  in the range of 20% to 40%, 
that is,  0 between  about 3.5 and 6. 346 *  OBSTFELD  & ROGOFF 
of  0 =  20,  as Wei proposes,  does  not  seem  so  wild-eyed.  Brown  and 
Stern (1989) use  6 =  15 for their policy  experiments. 
2.4 EMPIRICAL  ESTIMATES  OF TRADE  COSTS  T 
There is far less  consensus  about the  size  of trade costs,  which  include 
(among  other things),  tariffs, nontariff barriers, and transport costs.  For 
1993,  average  tariffs,  on  a  domestic-production-weighted  basis,  were 
4.9% for the  United  States,  7.7% for the  European  Union,  3.5% for Ja- 
pan,  and  8.9% for Canada.6 As  for nontariff  barriers, official  statistics 
only  give  information  on their existence,  not  their effectiveness,  which 
must  be  estimated  using  an  economic  model.  Anderson  and  Neary 
(1998) use  a simple  computable  general  equilibrium  model  to estimate 
uniform  tariff  equivalents  for  nontariff  barriers  for  a broad  range  of 
countries,  and typically  find estimates  on the same  order of magnitude 
as for tariffs, larger of course for some  countries  (such as Japan) than for 
others  (such as the United  States).  This result is also consistent  with  the 
trade-equation  estimates  of Lee and Swagel  (1997).7 
Differential  international  transportation  costs  are also  an  important 
potential  element  of 7.8 If one  looks  across all commodities  on  a value- 
weighted  basis,  freight and insurance  charges for U.S.  imports averaged 
3.6% in 1995, and 3.3% in 1996 and  1997.9 But these  numbers  consider- 
ably understate  average  costs  in international  shipping.  First, As Hum- 
mels (1999a) shows,  average costs are much higher for many other coun- 
tries (the United  States has a vast coastline,  and sea shipping  tends  to be 
much  cheaper  than  shipping  by  land).  Second,  these  numbers  do  not 
include  other considerable  costs of international  shipping,  including  pre- 
paring the paperwork  (bills of lading)  needed  to clear international  cus- 
toms,  and the costs of delays  either in transit or at port of entry. 
Just as  empirical  measures  of  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between 
home  and foreign  goods  may be biased  downwards,  it is also likely that 
simple  estimates  of average  transport costs  grossly  understate  average  r 
across  all goods  in the economy  (due  to substitution  effects).  Table 1 is 
drawn from Hummels  (1999a), who  based his estimates  on highly  disag- 
6. See OECD (1996, Table 1.1, row 9). 
7. Harrigan (1993), however,  finds  nontariff barriers insignificant  compared  to tariffs and 
transportation  costs. 
8. Recall that Helliwell's  and  McCallum's  estimates  use  distance  in an attempt  to control 
for transport  costs.  Geographical  distance  is an imperfect  measure  of these,  however. 
9. The authors  are grateful to Robert Feenstra for compiling  these  numbers  based  on  U.S. 
Imports of Merchandise, U.S.  Census  Bureau.  The  estimates  give  shipping  and  freight 
charges  as a percentage  of total value  of imports  excluding  these  charges.  Importantly, 
these  numbers  do  not  include  any  inland  shipping  at point  of  departure  or  port  of 
arrival. The  Six  Major  Puzzles  in International  Macroeconomics  ?  347 
Table 1  COMMODITY  DISTRIBUTION  OF FREIGHT  RATES  (UNITED 
STATES,  1994)a 
Averagefreight  rate 
Commodity  Trade-weighted  unweighted 
All goods  3.8 
Food and live animals  8.2  14.1 
Beverages  and tobacco  6.9  14.4 
Crude materials  8.2  15.1 
Mineral  fuels, lubricants  6.6  15.7 
Animal and veg. oils, fats  7.1  10.6 
Chemicals  and related  products  4.5  9.0 
Manuf. goods (by material)  5.3  10.3 
Machinery  and transp. equip.  2.0  5.7 
Misc. manufactures  4.7  8.3 
All other goods, NES  1.0  2.5 
aSource:  Hummels (1999a),  compiled from U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Imports  of Merchandise.  Freight 
costs include shipping and insurance  as a percentage  of total FAS  value. Calculations  are based on 10- 
digit Harmonized  System level data (over 15,000  categories  of goods). Unweighted shipping costs are 
based on all individual  goods imported. 
gregated  10-digit  data.  We see  from  the  table  that  shipping  costs  for 
many  categories  of goods  are quite a bit larger than the average  (trade- 
weighted)  shipping  costs-and  this  table  excludes  goods  that  are not 
traded at all. 
What other factors might be included  in r?  In a provocative  paper, Rose 
(2000) uses  a gravity model  to argue that countries  with currency unions 
trade  two  to  three  times  as  much  with  each  other  as  countries  with 
separate  currencies.  Certainly, currency conversion  costs and exchange- 
rate uncertainty  can add to trade costs.  While  exchange-rate  variability 
can have direct negative  effects on capital flows,  any direct negative  effect 
on  trade  flows  will  result  in  an  additional,  indirect  source  of  capital- 
market  imperfection  according  to  our analysis.  A  similar point  can be 
made  for various  informational  costs  of international  trade; see  Rauch 
(1999) and Portes and Rey (1999) for discussion  and some  empirical evi- 
dence.10 Differences  in legal  and  payments  systems  may  also  add to  r. 
Last, but not least,  it is important  to emphasize  that our analysis  has 
assumed  no home bias in preferences.  Suppose  we replace the represen- 
tative home  agent's  utility function  (1) with 
10. Anderson  and Marcouiller (1999) argue that corruption and imperfect contract enforce- 
ment  are major factors in disrupting  trade,  especially  in developing  countries.  Since 
our main focus  is on industrialized  countries,  we  will not consider  these  categories  of 
trade cost further here. 348 *  OBSTFELD  & ROGOFF 
U =  (C(H )/  +  wC  1)/)?/0-1)  (7) 
and the representative  foreign agent's utility function with 
U* =  (wC *(-1)/S  +  CF-'/1)/0)-1) 
One can easily show that the effects of home bias in preferences (w < 1) 
can be isomorphic to the effects of trade costs r. Helpman (1999)  argues 
that once one controls for income, there is no clear evidence of home 
bias in preferences. Indeed, it is more illuminating  to derive trade  biases 
from other frictions. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that a 
home bias in demand for goods can work similarly  to trade  costs, at least 
for the trade and portfolio-bias  puzzles. 
2.5 OTHER  REAL-TRADE  PU7ZI7.S 
Though international-finance  puzzles are our main focus, we note that 
trade costs can explain a number of real-trade  puzzles as well. For  exam- 
ple, Trefler's  (1995) favored explanation of the "missing trade" puzzle 
combines Hicks-neutral  productivity differences across countries with a 
home bias in consumption (which, per our discussion above, may be 
induced by transport  costs).ll Deardorff  (1998)  points out that with trans- 
port costs,  the  standard conditions for factor-price equalization in a 
Heckscher-Ohlin world break down, also implying greater specializa- 
tion. Since factor-price  equalization fails miserably empirically,  this im- 
plies another important puzzle that can be at least partially  resolved by 
transport costs.  Anderson (1979), Deardorff (1998), and others have 
shown  that transport costs can help explain the surprising empirical 
robustness of the gravity  equation of trade flows. Not only do trade costs 
help to resolve a number of puzzles in the data, they also seem to be 
important in determining economic performance. Radelet and Sachs 
(1998)  argue that countries that have high shipping costs due to adverse 
geography (for example, high mountains or limited port access) grow 
much more slowly than countries with natural transport advantages. 
Finally,  we note that evidence on international  price differentials  seems 
quite consistent with the high degree of market  segmentation evinced on 
the quantities side; we shall refer  to this work later in discussing puzzles 
5 and 6. 
Armed with a simple understanding of how plausible trade costs to- 
gether with high elasticities of substitution in consumption can explain 
11. "Missing trade" is how  Trefler describes  the puzzle  that the imputed  factor content  of 
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substantial  home  biases  in trade, we  are ready to explore the linkages  to 
other macro puzzles. 
3.  The  Feldstein-Horioka  Puzzle  (Puzzle  2) 
There  has  been  no  shortage  of  explanations  for  the  famous  saving- 
investment  puzzle  of Feldstein  and Horioka (1980), with  numerous  arti- 
cles on the topic having  been  published  in most of the leading journals. 
The problem  is that none  of the explanations  advanced  to date (includ- 
ing  our own  attempts)  has been  terribly convincing.  Most explanations 
tend to be clever but empirically inadequate  and, more troublesome  still, 
tend to fix one puzzle  at the expense  of creating others.  The fact that the 
Feldstein-Horioka  regularity does not seem  to characterize intranational 
regional  data  suggests  that factors  intrinsic  to  trade between  different 
nations  are at work.12 
3.1 STILL  A PUZZLE 
What  Feldstein  and  Horioka  actually  demonstrated,  of  course,  is  that 
across  OECD  countries,  long-period  averages  of national  saving  rates 
are highly  correlated with similar averages of domestic  investment  rates. 
Indeed,  in the original data sample  examined  by Feldstein and Horioka, 
covering  1960 through the mid-1970s, cross-section  regressions  of invest- 
ment  on  saving  yielded  slope  coefficients  near  unity.  True,  this 
Feldstein-Horioka  coefficient-which  the  original  work  interpreted  as 
measuring  the  effect  of  the  saving  rate  on  the  investment  rate,  or  a 
"savings  retention"  measure-has  fallen  over  time.  As  Table 2  illus- 
trates,  however,  it still  remains  large  and  significant.  The  table  gives 
simple  cross-country  regressions  of investment  (relative to GDP) against 
national  saving  (relative  to  GDP),  taking  eight-year  averages  for  the 
most  recent period,  1990-1997.  For the OECD countries,  the coefficient 
(0.60)  is  a  good  deal  smaller  than  the  0.89  found  in  Feldstein  and 
Horioka's  original work,  but it is still larger than one  might  expect  in a 
world  of  fully  integrated  capital  markets  where  global  savings  should 
flow  to the regions  with  the highest  rates of return. The coefficient  falls 
further once one includes  countries  outside  the OECD (particularly poor 
countries),  although  the extended  results  must be viewed  with  extreme 
caution  given  the poor  quality  of national  income  and product  data for 
most  non-OECD  countries.  (The data underlying  the regressions  in Ta- 
ble 2 are reported  in Table 7 in the appendix,  which  also describes  how 
the countries  in the sample  were  chosen.) 
12. See Obstfeld  (1995),  Obstfeld  and Rogoff (1996),  and Coakley,  Kulasi,  and Smith  (1998) 
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Table 2  FELDSTEIN-HORIOKA  REGRESSIONS, I/Y  =  a +  13  NS/Y +  E, 
1990-1997a 
No. of obs.  a  13  R2 
All countriesb  56  0.15  0.41  0.33 
(0.02)  (0.08) 
Countries  with  GNP/cap.  >  1000  48  0.13  0.48  0.39 
(0.02)  (0.09) 
Countries  with  GNP/cap.  >  2000  41  0.07  0.70  0.62 
(0.02)  (0.09) 
OECD countriesc  24  0.08  0.60  0.68 
(0.02)  (0.09) 
aOLS regressions.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
bIsrael is excluded  from all regressions  in this table. If Israel is added  to the samples  of size  (56, 48, 41), 
the estimates  of /  are (0.39, 0.45, 0.63). 
If  one  adds  Korea to the OECD sample,  the estimate  for  3 rises to 0.76.  Korea is included  in the larger 
samples. 
The Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle  is durable because  the core regression 
simply  summarizes  in  a compact  way  the  fact that  OECD  current  ac- 
counts  tend  to be surprisingly  small relative  to total saving  and invest- 
ment,  especially  when  one  averages  over  any  sustained  period.  For 
developing  countries,  notably  the many  that have  repeatedly  had trou- 
ble servicing  debts,  it is perhaps  not so surprising  that creditors prevent 
them from running  up large sustained  deficits.  But it is hard to appeal to 
sovereign-default  risk for OECD countries,  especially  when  one consid- 
ers that gross international  flows  of financial assets are much bigger than 
net international flows.  Indeed,  for OECD countries,  asset price compari- 
sons  suggest  a high  degree  of integration; arbitrage in similar nominally 
risk-free assets  appears  to be nearly perfect.  We leave  it to the reader to 
look at other sources  (for example,  Obstfeld  and Rogoff, 1996, Chapter 3) 
for assessments  of previous  attempts  to explain  the  Feldstein-Horioka 
conundrum. 
A  fair summary  of  the  literature is  that  there  are at least  five  or six 
leading  explanations  (and ten or so close seconds).  All are unconvincing 
empirically-some  because  they  are based  on very  special  assumptions 
about the nature of the exogenous  shocks  (e.g.,  Obstfeld,  1986, or Men- 
doza,  1991), others because  they raise collateral empirical contradictions. 
For  example,  in  the  asymmetric  information  model  of  Gordon  and 
Bovenberg (1996), a "lemons" problem is invoked  to explain why foreign- 
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interest  parity must  also be assumed  if there is to be any foreign  equity 
inflow  at all. Explanations  that try to maintain the assumption  of perfect 
capital mobility  often  have  the  strong  implication  that one  should  also 
observe  high  saving-investment  correlations  across  states  or  regions 
within  a given  country. But the partial evidence  available on saving  and 
investment  by  subnational  regions  simply  does  not  produce  the  Feld- 
stein-Horioka  regularity; see,  for example,  Helliwell  (1998, Chapter 4). 
We are going  to  propose  here  an  entirely  new  explanation,  based  on 
transaction  costs  for international  trade in goods.  An  especially  attrac- 
tive feature of our approach is that it seems  to help resolve  other puzzles 
rather than exacerbating them. 
It is important  to emphasize  that whereas  our model  includes  trade 
costs  for goods,  it is consistent  with  free and costless  trade in securities. 
Thus,  it is perfectly  consistent  with  the  observation  that gross  interna- 
tional flows  of securities are substantial even  though  net flows  are small. 
Our account is also notable both for endogenizing  the price and interest 
effects  of trade impediments,  and for showing  how  moderate  transport 
costs  could  generate  empirically  significant  international  differences  in 
real interest rates despite  full asset-market  integration. 
3.2 TRANSPORT  COSTS  CAN INDUCE  A NONLINEAR 
RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  THE  CURRENT  ACCOUNT  AND THE 
REAL  INTEREST  RATE 
The basic  intuition  of why  transport  costs  can temper  current-account 
imbalances  can be illustrated in a standard two-period,  two-good,  small- 
country  endowment  model.  It would  not be difficult to endogenize  the 
world  real interest  rate,  or to  incorporate  uncertainty  (as  in  the  next 
section),  but neither generalization  is essential here. We will later discuss 
investment  to  confirm  that  the  basic  argument  we  make  still  goes 
through. 
The model  below  is entirely  standard  except that we  will  again allow 
for Samuelsonian  "iceberg" costs in trade, so that T  percent  of any good 
is lost in transit. The utility function  of a representative  home  resident  is 
u(C)  +  8u(C2), 
where  total real consumption  C depends  on consumption  of the home 
and foreign goods,  CH  and CF,  with constant elasticity of substitution  0 as 
in equation  (1). The small country  is endowed  only  with  good  H, with 
YH,1 in  period  1,  and  YH,2  in period  2.  Good  F must  always  be  imported. 
(Endowing  the country  with  both  goods  would  not  overturn  our argu- 
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effect on the world  prices PH  and PF, which  are constant  across the two 
periods  in terms of a world unit of account (money).  Nor can it affect the 
foreign  real interest  rate r* (which  equals  the  foreign  nominal  interest 
rate assuming  there is zero foreign  inflation).  Because  of iceberg  transit 
costs  T in shipping  either  good,  however,  home  consumption  patterns 
can affect home  relative prices and the home  real interest rate. 
Though  we  shall give  a formal analysis  below,  the basic argument  is 
simple.  Suppose,  for example,  that the country's endowment  pattern and 
rate of time preference  8 are such  that in the first period,  net exports  of 
good  H are negative  (in which  case intertemporal  solvency  dictates they 
must  be  positive  in  period  2).  Then,  as we  shall  shortly  confirm,  the 
relative price of good H will be higher in period  1 than in period 2. There 
will be expected  deflation,  and the home real interest rate will be above r*. 
The situation  is  reversed  when  the  country  is initially  running  a suffi- 
ciently large current-account  surplus,  so that its real consumption-based 
lending  rate must  lie below  r*. As we  demonstrate  formally below,  this 
effect can be quite dramatic, assuming  realistic values for trade costs  and 
the elasticity  of substitution  0 (values  similar to those  needed  to resolve 
the home-bias-in-trade  puzzle).13 
3.3 BUDGET  CONSTRAINTS  AND TRANSPORT  COSTS 
A formal analysis  requires one  to think carefully  about the budget  con- 
straints facing the representative  agent.  In general,  the first-period bud- 
get constraint can be written  as 
PH1H,1  +  D  H  PH,1CH,l  +  PF,1CF,1l  PlCl 
where  PH  (PF)  is the home-soil  price of good  H (F) in terms of the world 
currency unit,  and D is borrowing  from abroad in world  currency units. 
The overall home  price level,  in terms of world  currency units,  is 
P =  (Pj-0 + p-)/l-  .  (8) 
Therefore,  given  a  total  real  consumption  level  C in  any  period,  the 
consumptions  of the two individual  home  and foreign goods  are 
PH -  C-  (9F  CH=  )  C,  CF=  P  C.  (9) 
13. Dumas (1992)  likewise shows how international  real interest-rate  differentials  can arise 
in a model with transport  costs, though, as we have already  noted, his one-good model 
is very different  and he does not explore the implications  for the Feldstein-Horioka 
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Similarly,  the  second-period  budget  constraint,  measured  in  world 
currency units,  is 
PH,2H,2  -  (1  +  r*)D =  PH,2CH,2  +  PF,2CF,2  =  P2C2. 
Combining  the  period  budget  constraints  gives  the  consolidated  inter- 
temporal budget  constraint as 
P2C2  PH,2YH,2 
PC11 +  =PH,  lYH,1  + 
1  + r*  1 + r* 
or, in terms of the  domestic  real interest  rate 1 +  r =  (1 +  r*)PI/P2, as 
C2  PHlyHl  1  PH,2H,2 
C,  +  +  )PYH  (10) 
1 + r  Pi  +  r  P2 
3.4 INFLATION 
Since good  F is always  imported,  its home  price, PF =PF/(1 -  r), must be 
higher  than the  foreign  price in both  periods,  per equation  (2). By the 
same  logic,  when  good  H is exported-  as it must  be in at least one  of 
the two periods-its  home  price PH = PH(1 -  T)  must be lower  than the 
foreign  price,  per equation  (3). However,  if total  domestic  spending  is 
high  enough  relative  to income  in any  given  period,  it is possible  that 
good  H is  imported rather than  exported  (CH >  YH), in  which  case  its 
home  price PH = PH/(1 -  T)  must be higher than the foreign price. As we 
shall  see,  there are also important  intermediate  cases where  CH  =  YH  in 
one  period,  in which  case PH  will turn out to lie between  P*(1 -  r) and 
P*/(1 -  T), despite  the fact that no goods  roundtrip. 
3.5 A GRAPHICAL  ANALYSIS  OF THE  LINK  BETWEEN  REAL 
INTEREST  RATES  AND CURRENT  ACCOUNTS 
The link between  the effective  real interest rate faced by the home  coun- 
try  and  its  first-period  borrowing  decision  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1, 
which  plots  total real consumption  in period  1, C1, against the domestic 
real interest rate, 1 + r. (Note  that the period  1 current account deficit is 
simply  Y1 -  C1). The  resulting  graph  is  a  step  function  that  can  be 
divided  up  into  five  segments;  it shows  the  schedule  of  effective  real 
interest rates faced by the country as a function of its borrowing-lending 
decision. 
In the  first segment  C1 is  so  low,  and  the  period  1 current-account 
surplus  so high,  that in period  2 the  country  will  consume  an amount 354 *  OBSTFELD & ROGOFF 
Figure 1 DOMESTIC SPENDING AND  THE DOMESTIC REAL INTEREST 
RATE IN A TWO-GOOD MODEL WITH TRADE COSTS 
Domestic  real  interest  rate,  1 + r 
V 
World  real  l  / 
interest  --------  -- 
rate,  1 +  r 
First-period  total  real 
spending,  Cl 
CH,2  >  YH,2 Since in period 2 the home  good  must be imported,  while  in 
period  1 it is exported,  we  have 
(1  +  r*) (P,-19 +  P-  9)11(1-9) 
1  + 
H  F 
(Pk2  ?  P:/9) 
(1 +  r*) {[PH(1  -  7)11-0  +  Pl-}1/(1-  ) 
F=  < 1  +  r* 
{[P/(1 
- 
T)]1-  +  p/-F  1/-(0) 
in segment  I. If the country  contemplates  being  a big lender,  it will face 
an effective  real interest  rate significantly  below the  world  real interest 
rate. 
Segment  II starts when  period  1 consumption  first reaches the level Cln 
such  that  CH,2 =  YH,2- In this  region,  PH,2 is determined  by  equation  (8) and 
the  first  relation  in  equation  (9),  with  CH,2  = 
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tripping).  Period 2 consumption  of the home  good  remains  constant  at 
YH,2  as long as PH2  remains strictly between  P((1  -  T)  and P*/(1 -  T),  but 
equation  (9) implies  that PH,2  falls as C1  rises and C2  falls, until PH,2  reaches 
P*(1 -  T).  Accordingly, the real interest rate rises over segment  II.14  At the 
point C1 = Cm,  Segment  III  begins  as the home  country becomes  a period 
2 exporter  of  its  endowment  good.  On  this  stretch,  1  +  r  =  1  +  r*. 
Because here,  CH <  YH  in both periods,  the overall price level is constant 
over  time.  In  region  III,  the  country  is  running  a  sufficiently  small 
current-account  surplus  or deficit that there is never  any reversal of the 
pattern  of trade  in either  good.  It is precisely  in this  region  that trade 
costs have no effect on the real interest rate. 
At C1 = Cv, however,  CH, reaches YH,, and the real interest rate begins 
to rise once  more.  In segment  IV, CH, remains  stuck at YH,1 as C1 rises, 
pushing  PH,1  up with  it until PH, reaches  PH/(1 -  7). As P,H  rises along 
segment  IV, with  PH2  constant  at PH(1 -  T), the real interest rate rises. At 
Cv, however,  where  PH, first reaches  PH/(1 -  T), the country becomes  a 
period  1 importer of its own  endowment  good,  and the real interest rate 
stabilizes  (along segment  V) at the level 
+ r (1  +  r*) {[PH/(1  -  T)]1-o +  P1-J}1/(1-)  +  l+r  =  >1  + r* 
{[P4(1  -  T)]1'-  +  Pl-U1/(1-9) 
The range of possible  real interest rates produced  by this simple  exam- 
ple can encompass  a wide  distribution.  For example,  with  r* = 0.05,  r = 
0.1,  0 = 6, and PH  = PF = 1, we find that the highest  possible  real interest 
rate is 20% (15% above  the  world  level)  while  the  lowest  is  -8%  (13% 
below  the world  level).  The interplay between  the commodity  transport 
costs  T and the substitution  elasticity  0 is similar to what  we  saw  in the 
preceding  section.  As 0 rises, the maximum  and minimum  real domestic 
interest  rates  move  apart-with  higher  substitutability,  the  price-level 
impacts  of changes  in P,  are more pronounced.  In the limiting case as 0 
-oo the two  goods  are asymptotically  perfect substitutes,  in which  case 
the  country's  effective  real borrowing  rate will be 30%, and its lending 
rate,  -15%! 
Of course,  the  range  of real domestic  interest  rates encompassed  by 
Figure  1 is far greater than  what  we  usually  observe  in practice,  espe- 
cially for OECD countries.  But this simply  reflects the fact that incipient 
14. The increasing  portions  of the schedule  have the shapes  we  show  for 0-values that are 
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real interest  differentials  put  a sharp check on a country's  incentives  to 
run large current-account  deficits or surpluses.15 
3.6 EXTENSIONS  AND ALTERNATIVE  FORMULATIONS 
The preceding  account of the effect of domestic  spending  on real interest 
rates is overly  stylized,  but a number  of obvious  extensions  can add to 
realism without  diluting  the main message. 
3.6.1  A Continuum of Goods and Transport  Costs  Assume,  for example, 
that countries  are endowed  with  multiple  goods  in various  proportions 
and that these  goods  display  a distribution  of transport costs.  Then,  as 
domestic  spending  rises,  progressively  more  types  of  goods  are  im- 
ported  from  abroad,  leading  to  a steadily  rising  real domestic  interest 
rate. In this  more  realistic setup,  the relationship  between  expenditure 
and the home  real interest  rate will  still resemble  a version  of Figure 1, 
but with very many small steps-to  the naked eye,  a smoothly  upward- 
sloping  curve.  With a rich enough  range of goods,  transport costs,  and 
elasticities  of substitution,  even  small current-account  deficits may pro- 
duce trade reversals in a small number  of goods,  thereby resulting  in an 
interest-rate  effect.  We conjecture,  though  it remains  to be proved,  that 
one would  obtain a similar nonlinearity  to that depicted  in Figure 1, with 
small  current-account  imbalances  having  relatively  little effect on inter- 
est differentials. 
3.6.2  Long-Term  Borrowing  and Lending  An obvious  question  is how  the 
results  here  might  be  tempered  in a model  with  many  periods  so  that 
there are opportunities  for long-term  borrowing  and lending.  For exam- 
ple,  if a country ran a big current-account  deficit in the initial periods,  it 
could  repay slowly  over many  periods.  Though  a more careful analysis 
is required than we can provide here, it seems  unlikely  that this consider- 
ation  would  overturn  our basic  point;  there  would  still be  a big  price 
swing  between  the  big  deficit  periods  and  surplus  periods-which  is 
precisely  why  a country would  seek to avoid such  swings.  We note  also 
that in a richer model  with  a continuum  of goods,  the  current account 
would  not  necessarily  have  to  swing  between  deficit  and  surplus  to 
induce  real-interest-rate  effects.  In general,  the range and type of goods 
15. The suggestion  that idiosyncratic  real-interest-rate  developments  might  help  explain 
the  Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle  can  be  found  in  earlier  work,  for  example,  Frankel 
(1986). However,  to the extent that real-interest-rate effects have been touched  upon  in 
the literature,  no one has taken the idea very seriously,  since earlier models  could  not 
give  any  reason  why  the  real interest  rate might  be  so  important  quantitatively.  Nor 
could  they  really  explain  the  durability  of the  Feldstein-Horioka  relationship  across 
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being  imported  and/or exported  will  vary more  or less  continuously  in 
the level of trade-balance deficit (or surplus).  Thus,  the real-interest-rate 
effect will arise along any path where there are big trade-balance swings, 
either over any short period,  or cumulatively  over any long period.  This 
would  be true even  in a setting  with growth  in which  countries  could,  in 
principle,  run perpetual  deficits and surpluses. 
3.6.3  Investment  How  is the preceding  analysis  affected by introducing 
investment?  In  the  case  where  the  country  desires  to  be  a  large  net 
borrower  (segments  IV and V), the real-interest-rate  effect will be tem- 
pered  to the  extent  the  country  can cut back on  investment  instead  of 
borrowing  from  abroad.  But that very  mechanism  dictates  that reduc- 
tions  in national  saving  will be accompanied  by reductions  in domestic 
investment.  In segments  I and II, the country could  channel  some  of its 
higher  savings  into  higher  investment,  again  tempering  the  fall in the 
effective  real  interest  rate but  creating  the  positive  Feldstein-Horioka 
correlation  between  increases  in  saving  and  increases  in investment.16 
3.6.4  Deriving Similar Results in a More Conventional  Setup with Traded  and 
Nontraded  Goods  The reader may well  ask whether  we  needed  such  an 
extravagant  formulation  to make the basic point  that the consumption- 
based real interest rate can be linked to the current account.  Couldn't we 
have  made  the  same  point  in  the  context  of  a standard  Salter-Swan 
model  having  two classes  of goods,  one with infinite trade costs and the 
other with  zero  trade costs  (as discussed,  for example,  in Chapter 4 of 
Obstfeld  and  Rogoff,  1996)? Indeed,  for a pure  endowment  case,  the 
standard traded-nontraded  model  does produce  a graph very much like 
Figure 1. Holding  endowments  of both goods  flat, if the country chooses 
to run a large deficit  in period  1, the price  of nontraded  goods  will  be 
high  in  that  period,  and  low  in  the  following  period.  This  implies  a 
consumption-based  real interest  rate above  the world  interest  rate, just 
as in segments  IV and V of Figure 1, and the effect can similarly be non- 
linear.  We prefer  our  formulation  largely  because  it is  much  easier  to 
think concretely  about trade costs  than about the arbitrary dividing  line 
between  traded  and  nontraded  goods.  Perhaps  the  ideal  model  would 
be  a richer one  incorporating  a range  of  transport  costs  in  which  the 
degree  of  tradability  is  endogenous  and  some  goods  are consistently 
produced  exclusively  for the home  market. 
16. Though their focus is on the short-run time-series  properties  of the data rather than on 
the  Feldstein-Horioka  regularity,  Backus,  Kehoe,  and  Kydland  (1992) do note  that a 
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3.6.5  Monopoly Pricing  and  Sticky Prices  Our  analysis  assumes  that 
prices  are flexible  and  set  in competitive  markets.  Introducing  realistic 
features  such  as price rigidity  and  monopoly  pricing,  as in our discus- 
sion of puzzles  5 and 6, would  enrich the model  without  overturning  the 
main  points.  Also,  the  most  troubling  manifestations  of the  Feldstein- 
Horioka  puzzle  are at medium-term  horizons  of  five  to  fifteen  years, 
when  price flexibility is much  greater and firms' ability to preserve  mo- 
nopoly  power  is less. 
3.7 EMPIRICS 
The  model  does  contain  one  simple  prediction  that  can  easily  be 
checked.  Countries  running  current-account  surpluses  should  have 
lower  real interest rates than countries  running  deficits. 
This connection  is illustrated  in the panel  regression  results  reported 
in Table 3. Specification  1 regresses  the  domestic  real interest  rate, de- 
fined  as the  average  three-month  nominal  interest  rate in a given  year 
less  lagged  annual inflation,  on the ratio of the current-account  surplus 
to GDP. Specification  2 forms real interest rates by using  December  aver- 
age nominal  interest rates in year t less  year t inflation,  in an attempt  to 
Table  3  REAL  INTEREST  RATES  AND THE  CURRENT  ACCOUNT, 
1975-1998 
Coefficient 
on CA/GDP  Significance  p  R2 
Specification  1 
OLS  -36.9  0.00  0.65  0.05 
Country  fixed effects  -46.3  0.00  0.65  0.08 
Country  fixed effects, time dummies  -32.3  0.00  0.55  0.50 
Specification  2 
OLS  -17.9  0.00  0.58  0.02 
Country  fixed effects  -19.4  0.00  0.58  0.05 
Country  fixed effects, time dummies  -18.9  0.01  0.54  0.32 
The dependent  variable  is the annualized  three-month  nominal  interest  rate  less lagged annual  inflation 
CPI  rate (specification  1) or less the contemporaneous  inflation  rate (specification  2). The sample uses 
annual  data  and covers  the years  1975-1998  and all OECD  countries  except Iceland,  Korea,  Mexico,  and 
Turkey.  Current  accounts (as a percentage  of GDP) are reported  by the OECD. We use three-month 
interest  rates,  usually  a Treasury  bill rate,  but an interbank  rate  if no government  rate  is available.  These 
data  come from  International  Financial  Statistics  and the OECD.  CPI  inflation  rates  are  based on IFS  data. 
For  the specification  2 regressions,  four countries  did not report  monthly interest-rate  data until after 
the start  of our sample. The countries,  with their  starting  dates in parentheses,  are  Spain  (1977),  Greece 
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capture  that agents  can incorporate  contemporaneous  information  into 
forming  inflation  expectations.  In  both  specifications  we  employ  an 
autoregressive  correction.  We report estimates  for simple  ordinary least 
squares  (OLS),  a model  with  country  fixed  effects,  and  a model  with 
fixed effects and time dummies  (the latter to capture global influences  on 
national  real interest rates). 
The results  show  highly  significant  negative  correlations between  the 
current-account surplus and the real domestic  interest rate, as our model 
suggests.  However,  the two  specifications  differ somewhat  in their nu- 
merical predictions,  with  specification  1 giving  an effect that is substan- 
tially  larger than  that  given  by  specification  2.  Taking the  regressions 
with country fixed effects and time dummies  as likely to be most reliable, 
we  see  that  a 1% of  GDP  rise  in  an  OECD  country's  current-account 
surplus  is associated  with  roughly  a 20- to 30-basis-point  decline  in its 
real interest rate.17 
4.  The  Puzzle  of Home  Bias  in Equity  Portfolios  (Puzzle  3) 
Despite  the  rapid  growth  of  international  capital  markets  toward  the 
close  of the  twentieth  century  and  a much  expanded  world  market for 
equities,  stock-market  investors  maintain  a  puzzling  preference  for 
home  assets.  When  they  first highlighted  the  extent  of the  home-bias 
portfolio  puzzle  at the  end  of the  1980s, French and Poterba (1991) ob- 
served  that Americans  held  roughly  94% of their equity  wealth  in the 
U.S. stock market whereas  the Japanese held roughly 98% of their equity 
wealth  at home.18 Figure 2,  drawn  from Tesar and Werner (1998), sug- 
gests  that the home  equity  bias is muted  for smaller  countries  and has 
shown  some  tendency  to  decline  over  time-by  the  mid-1990s  about 
10% of  U.S.  equity  wealth  was  invested  abroad.  Standard  models  of 
optimal  international  portfolio  diversification  imply,  however,  that eq- 
uity investors  still have not diversified  internationally  nearly as much as 
they  should,  and so the puzzle  remains.19 
17. We  experimented  with a number  of other  specifications,  expected  inflation  proxies,  and 
time periods, almost  always finding  results  similar  to those reported  in Table  3. Gordon 
and Bovenberg  (1996)  also establish a relationship  between current  accounts and real 
interest  rates  for OECD  countries,  but their  test and their  specification  are  motivated  by 
a model that is very different  than ours. 
18. See also Golub  (1990),  who compared  gross international  asset flows with gross domes- 
tic asset creation  for OECD  countries. 
19. University of California  investment policies illustrate the extent and persistence of 
home bias even for large, sophisticated  investors. On April 20, 2000, the U.C. regents 
announced a revision in investment guidelines for the university's retirement  and 
endowment funds. The overall target portfolio share for equities remained at 65%, 
but the recommended  target share for non-U.S. equities, previously zero,  was raised 360 *  OBSTFELD  & ROGOFF 
Figure  2 HOME  BIAS  IN EQUITY  PORTFOLIOS:  1987-1996 
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Potential  explanations  range  from nontraded  factors  such  as human 
capital (which may worsen  or reduce the puzzle; see Baxter and Jermann, 
1997) to nontraded  consumption  goods  to asymmetries  of information  to 
data inadequacy. Yet it is fair to say that none of the available stories alone 
has provided  a quantitatively  satisfactory account of the observed  home 
bias; see Lewis  (1999) for an up-to-date  and thorough  survey. 
To set  the  stage  for  our  discussion  of  trade  costs,  it is  worthwhile 
briefly  reviewing  what  is  perhaps  the  leading  explanation,  which  is 
based  on  the  classic  Salter-Swan  traded-nontraded-goods  dichotomy 
we  have  already mentioned.  While these  two types  of goods  lie at polar 
extremes  in  terms  of  their  tradability,  equity  claims  on  either type  of 
industry  can  be  frictionlessly  traded.  Thus,  even  though  cement  is 
prohibitively  costly  to transport,  there is nothing  to stop  foreign  inves- 
tors from buying  shares  in the  domestic  cement  industry.  Earnings,  of 
course,  must  be  redeemed  in traded  goods,  since  nontradables  cannot 
be shipped  to foreign  equity  holders  by assumption.  The key result one 
gets  out  of  this  framework  is  that,  for  the  baseline  case  of  separable 
to  7%. The  positive  target  position  in  foreign  equities,  meant  to  "reduce  risk  and 
broaden  portfolio  diversification  while  maintaining  or improving  investment  perfor- 
mance," represents  a substantial  advance.  It still falls far short, however,  of the optimal 
foreign  equity  share that simple  models  of international  diversification  would  predict. The Six Major Puzzles in International  Macroeconomics  ?  361 
preferences  (across  the  two  types  of  good),  investors  hold  a globally 
diversified  portfolio  of  traded-goods  industries.  But nontraded-goods 
industries  are  held  entirely  domestically.  The  intuition  is  that,  since 
payments  can  only  be  made  in  traded  goods  and  utility  is  separable, 
there  is  no  way  to  enhance  risk  sharing  in  tradables  by  linking  the 
allocation  of  tradables  consumption  to  returns  in nontraded-goods  in- 
dustries.  (That intuition  has to be modified  for the case of nonseparable 
preferences,  but it is still a useful  reference  point.20) Thus,  if nontraded 
goods  constitute,  say,  50% of  total  output  (a popular  rule  of  thumb 
based  on the fact that for many OECD countries,  services,  construction, 
and transport constitute  roughly  50% of GDP; see  Stockman  and Tesar, 
1995),  then  agents  will  (loosely  speaking)  hold  more  than  half  their 
equity in home  assets. 
While  elegant,  this  explanation  still is not  entirely  satisfactory. First, 
although  it goes  some  way  toward explaining  home  bias, it falls short of 
explaining  the  80% to 90% domestic  equity  shares  we  actually  observe 
(Figure 2). Second,  the sharp dichotomy  between  traded and nontraded 
goods  is  a contrived  one,  since  in  reality  transport  costs  differ  across 
goods,  and a particular good may or may not enter trade under different 
market  conditions.  For  most  goods,  tradability  is  not  absolute  and 
tradedness  is endogenous.21 
Here we will take an approach based  on intuition  similar to that in the 
preceding  discussion.  We explore just how  far can one get in explaining 
the home  portfolio bias by explicitly  introducing  trade costs,  rather than 
splitting  goods  into two arbitrary and dichotomous  categories.  What we 
will show  is that, with  a plausible  elasticity  of substitution  across goods 
and  reasonable-sized  costs  for trading  them,  our model  can produce  a 
very high  and realistic level of home  portfolio bias. 
4.1  A SIMPLE MODEL 
We now  add uncertainty  to the two-country  general equilibrium  version 
of  our  model,  with  each  country  having  a random  endowment  of  its 
distinct perishable  consumption  good,  along the lines of Lucas (1982) or 
Cole  and  Obstfeld  (1991).  To keep  notation  simple,  we  again  abstract 
from  dynamics  and  consider  a  one-period  portfolio  problem.  We  as- 
sume  a completely  symmetric  joint distribution  for the national  outputs 
(YH  YF). 
A home  or foreign individual  chooses  state-contingent  consumptions 
CH  and CF  of the home  and foreign goods  in order to maximize 
20. Baxter,  Jermann,  and King (1998)  develop some results for the case of nonseparable 
preferences. 
21. For  a more thorough discussion, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996,  Chapter  5). 362 *  OBSTFELD  & ROGOFF 
1  -/  \0/(f-1)~  -p  cl-p 
EU =  E  C8-1)/. + C(0-1)/  =E  .  (11) 
1-p 
H  F 
/  _  J  -1)-  p 
Above,  C is the  index  of total real consumption  [per equation  (1)],  0 is 
consumers'  elasticity  of  substitution  between  the  two  goods,  and  p is 
the coefficient  of relative risk aversion. 
There is free and costless  international  trade in a complete  set of state- 
contingent  Arrow-Debreu  securities.  (Imagine  again that the securities' 
payoffs  are made  in a costlessly  tradable international  monetary  unit of 
account.)  We continue  to  assume  that there  are iceberg  costs  of trade, 
such that only  a fraction 1 -  r of a unit of good  shipped  abroad reaches 
its destination,  so that under competitive  markets PF = PF/(1 -  r) and PH 
=  (1 -  r)PH,  per equations  (2) and (3).22 
Because,  in  addition,  the  countries  are  symmetric,  free  trade  in 
Arrow-Debreu  securities  yields  an allocation in which 
1  aU  1 aU 
PHaCH  PH aCH 
and 
1 au  1 aU* 
PF aCF  PF aCF 
for every  state of nature,  or 
CHV1  C1/8-P  =  (1 -  r)CZ-V0  C*1/-P  (12) 
and 
(1  -  r)C^F~/  Cv'-p  =  CF-1/0 C*l/-P.  (13) 
Together  these  conditions  imply  the  ex  post  consumption  efficiency 
condition 
PH  CF  CF  PH 
The model  is closed  by the output-market  clearing conditions: 
22. Just as in our discussion  of the  trade-bias puzzle,  one  could  obtain similar results  on 
home  bias in equity  holdings  if trade costs  were  zero but there existed  a home  bias in 
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H =  (1  -  T)(YH  -  CH), 
CF =  (1  -  r)(YF -  CF) 
Four of the preceding  five equations  are independent  and yield solutions 
for the consumption  levels  CH,  CF,  CH, and CF. 
4.2 INTERPRETING  THE  MODEL 
It may puzzle  some  readers that we  focus  on the Arrow-Debreu  alloca- 
tion when  in fact we  are interested  in relating  our analysis  to observed 
trade in the narrower class of equity-type  assets that one observes  in the 
real world.  One  rationale,  perhaps,  is that we  do not want  our theoreti- 
cal home bias results to be driven by ad hoc assumptions  about the kinds 
of securities  that can be  traded,  especially  since  many  assets  like debt 
and  direct  foreign  investment  have  complex  optionlike  qualities  that 
may be difficult to summarize  in a simple  model.  A second,  more prag- 
matic, rationale  is that the equilibrium  for the complete-markets  case is 
relatively simple to compute.  A final rationale, as we shall see,  is that for 
realistic parameters,  trade in equities alone can come quite close to attain- 
ing the complete-markets  consumption  allocation,  so that the home bias 
evident  under  complete  markets is a good  guide  to the home  bias in an 
equities-only  model. 
4.3 EVALUATING  THE  HOME  BIAS 
It is helpful  to begin by analyzing  the special  case p =  1/0, in which  the 
Arrow-Debreu  conditions  (12) and  (13) simplify  enormously.  One  can 
also show  that the Arrow-Debreu  allocation  is then  identical to the one 
in which people  can trade only straight equity shares. Given our assump- 
tion of symmetry,  the equilibrium  portfolio  shares are 
1 
XH  +  (1  -)1H 
(1  -  )0-1 
XH  =  Y-1 
1  +  (1  -  T) 
(1  -  y)0-1 
XF=  Y, 
1 +  (1 -  r)o-  F 
1 
1  +=  Y(  1 + (-1  -)0-1F 364 - OBSTFELD  & ROGOFF 
where  XH (XF)  denotes  the home  agent's  share of total equity in the home 
(foreign)  industry,  and  XH (X*)  denotes  the  foreigner's  optimal  equity 
shares.  Note  that  if  we  were  to  translate  these  equity  positions  into 
consumption shares,  we  would  find  cF and cH  lower  than  XF and X* by a 
factor of  1 -  r, reflecting  the  trade costs.  Of course,  in the  absence  of 
trade costs  all the portfolio  (and consumption)  shares  would  equal 0.5, 
reflecting full diversification  (under symmetry). 
For 0 =  6 and trade costs  of  r =  0.25 (again,  a seemingly  reasonable 
number when  applied  to all of output,  especially  compared  to the usual 
assumption  that fully half of output is nontraded),  one obtains XH  = 0.81, 
XH = 0.19. Since share prices will be equal due to symmetry,  this implies 
a home  equity  share of 81%. If 0 =  10, then  the home  portfolio  share of 
home  equities  is 72% even  with  trade costs  of just  10%. (As in the case 
of home  bias in trade,  there  is significant  nonlinearity:  the  elasticity  of 
foreign  shareholdings  with  respect  to trade costs is very high  when  r is 
near 1, but falls as trade costs  fall.) The preceding  calculations  constrain 
the  value  of p to equal  1/0, but,  as we  shall  now  demonstrate  numeri- 
cally, the  results  turn out  to be  remarkably  insensitive  to this  assump- 
tion,  given  realistic levels  of output  uncertainty. 
If we  relax  our  restriction  p  =  1/0,  the  exact  conditions  needed  to 
implement  the Arrow-Debreu  allocation  through  equity  trade alone are 
broken.  Trade costs  create  an  international  wedge  between  marginal 
rates of substitution  such that standard stock-market spanning  theorems 
no longer apply.23  Nevertheless,  one can still gain a good  deal of insight 
into  home  bias by  computing  the  state-contingent consumptions  of the 
two goods  in the Arrow-Debreu  efficient allocation. 
We  can  reduce  the  dimensionality  of  our  numerical  simulations  by 
noting  that, in equilibrium,  the ratios of consumption  to output,  H  CH/ 
YHJ  cF  CF  /YF,  c  -  CH/YH, and  cF =  C*/YF, depend  only  on  the  output 
ratio  YH  =  YH/YF.  Table 4 illustrates  how  the  consumption  ratios  CH and  CF 
differ both across states of nature and across a number  of settings  of the 
parameters  r, 0, and p.24 (The values  of cH and cF  are apparent  from the 
assumed  symmetry  of the model.)  Notice  that the home  country's  out- 
put shares decline  across states of nature as its relative endowment  rises. 
That pattern  compensates  the  foreign  country  for the  greater  share  of 
transport costs  it must  pay in states  of nature such  that home  output  is 
relatively  high,  and it is naturally more pronounced  the higher  the risk 
aversion  parameter p. 
For the cases in which  0 = 6 and T is 10% or 20%, the table documents 
23. See Obstfeld  and Rogoff  (1996, Section 5.3). 
24. In a "baseline" model  with  trade frictions in which  individuals  nonetheless  consume 
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Table  4  PORTFOLIO  POSITIONS  IN HOME  AND FOREIGN  GOODS  FOR 
STATE  OF NATURE  YH  e  YH/YF 
Parameter 
settings  Portfolio  shares  H, CF 
T  p  YH  =  0.8  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.2 
0.1  2  2  0.53, 0.43  0.53, 0.43  0.53, 0.43  0.53, 0.43  0.52, 0.42 
0.1  3  2  0.56, 0.41  0.55, 0.40  0.55, 0.40  0.55, 0.40  0.55, 0.40 
0.1  5  2  0.61, 0.37  0.61, 0.36  0.60, 0.36  0.60, 0.35  0.60, 0.35 
0.1  6  1/0  0.63, 0.33  0.63, 0.33  0.63, 0.33  0.63, 0.33  0.63, 0.33 
0.1  6  2  0.64, 0.35  0.63, 0.34  0.63, 0.33  0.62, 0.33  0.62, 0.32 
0.1  6  5  0.64, 0.35  0.64, 0.34  0.63, 0.33  0.62, 0.33  0.62, 0.32 
0.2  2  2  0.56, 0.36  0.56, 0.36  0.56, 0.36  0.55, 0.35  0.55, 0.35 
0.2  6  1/0  0.75, 0.20  0.75, 0.20  0.75, 0.20  0.75, 0.20  0.75, 0.20 
0.2  6  2  0.78, 0.22  0.76, 0.21  0.75, 0.20  0.74, 0.19  0.73, 0.18 
0.2  6  5  0.78, 0.22  0.77, 0.21  0.75, 0.20  0.74, 0.18  0.73, 0.18 
0.3  6  2  0.89, 0.13  0.87, 0.11  0.86, 0.10  0.84, 0.09  0.83, 0.08 
0.3  8  2  0.95, 0.08  0.94, 0.07  0.92, 0.05  0.91, 0.04  0.89, 0.04 
how  insensitive  the  portfolio  shares  are  even  to  large  changes  in  p. 
Because the results turn out to be fairly insensitive  to p, we find that our 
earlier calculations  are indeed  little affected by relaxing the assumption 
pO =  1. The low  sensitivity  to p over  the  range  of relative  output  out- 
comes  in Table 4 is consistent  with  the conjecture by Cole and Obstfeld 
(1991) that, for moderate  uncertainty,  the gains from global risk sharing 
may be so low as to be mostly  offset by costs of trade. Here, the equilib- 
rium with a rich variety of assets is not so different from the one in which 
individuals  can hold  only equity. Another  conclusion  we can draw from 
these  numbers  is that trade costs have  to be quite large before there is a 
substantial discrepancy between  the Arrow-Debreu  consumption  alloca- 
tion  and  the  one  that trade in equities  alone  would  produce.  Even  for 
trade costs of 30%, an equity  allocation that gave each country the same 
consumption  share  in  every state  of  nature  as  it  would  have  in  the 
Arrow-Debreu  equilibrium  only when  the realization was YH  =  1 would 
not entail a large departure from efficiency. As a result, even when  pO  f  1, 
the home  bias evident  in the complete-markets  example  is quite close to 
what  a model  of pure equity trade would  imply.25 
25. Backus,  Kehoe, and Kydland  (1992)  report  some relevant experiments  with their cali- 
brated  two-country,  complete-markets  version of the Brock-Mirman  stochastic  growth 
model. It is true that they do not focus on the equity home-bias  puzzle and that they 
allow for only a single consumption  good, effectively  making  the elasticity  of substitu- 
tion between national outputs infinite. However, the fact that they find that moderate 
transportation  costs produce an allocation close to that with full autarky  is quite in 
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4.4 CAVEATS 
We do not believe  that trade costs  in goods  markets are necessarily  the 
whole  story  in  explaining  observed  portfolio  biases,  and  we  certainly 
expect  that the kinds  of information  asymmetries  and legal  restrictions 
emphasized  in earlier work also play a role. These frictions can be viewed 
as trade costs in a broader sense,  as we  have noted,  and they can affect 
portfolios  through the trade-cost channel that we have emphasized  in this 
paper. Nevertheless,  it is remarkable that our simple  model based on the 
trade-cost  channel  alone  matches  up  so  well  to  the  data.  As  we  have 
noted,  our explanation  not only has the merit of (extreme) simplicity, but 
is also more convincing  because  the same basic approach  seems  to help 
explain such a diverse  range of puzzles.  Finally, we note that our results 
are consistent  with  recent empirical work by Portes and Rey (1999). They 
find that international trade in both equities and goods is surprisingly well 
explained  by an enhanced  gravity model in which  informational  distance 
proxies  supplement  the  standard  set  of geographical  explanatory  vari- 
ables.26 These results  are certainly in accord with our model's  prediction 
that equity biases  in large measure  reflect goods-market  biases.27 
A  caveat  to  our  findings  is  that  transaction  costs,  and  the  resulting 
home bias, would  be reduced somewhat  in a fully dynamic model.  Inves- 
tors could  then  reinvest  dividends  abroad rather than repatriating them 
immediately.  As  is  true  for a tax-deferred  asset,  they  could  earn  divi- 
dends  on wealth  that would  otherwise  be burned  up as shipping  costs. 
The  question  deserves  further  research.  Dumas  and  Uppal  (2000) de- 
velop  a dynamic  two-country  growth  model  with  shipping  costs,  but 
their focus is on welfare  rather than on the home-bias  puzzle.  (They also 
assume  0 =  0o throughout  by positing  a single  consumption  good.)  Our 
guess  is that trade costs  will remain an important  determinant  of home 
bias even  in a realistic dynamic  setting. 
We have  used  a complete-markets  model  to illustrate how  trade costs 
can  generate  a home  equity  bias.  By taking  that  modeling  approach, 
however,  we  certainly  do not  intend  to endorse  an empirical view  that 
26. Portes and Rey (1999) report that their information  variables are quite significant  in 
explaining  goods-market  trade, even after  controlling  for geographical  distance. 
27. One consideration  that dovetails  nicely with our explanation  is illustrated  in the model 
of Martin  and Rey (1999),  which provides the closest antecedent to our approach.  In 
Martin and Rey's (endogenously) incomplete-markets  setup, the main driving force 
behind home bias is that owners of home firms  retain  a disproportionate  share of their 
equity in order to extract a higher monopoly price for remaining shares from other 
agents. Martin  and Rey focus on transaction  costs in asset rather  than in goods mar- 
kets, in the tradition  of Aiyagari  and Gertler  (1991).  They posit an asymmetry  between 
transaction  costs for home and foreign  agents, and this cost also affects  share  values. It 
does not interact  with 0, however, so the effects are much smaller  than here. The  Six Major  Puzzles  in International  Macroeconomics  *  367 
real-world asset markets are complete  or nearly complete,  either domesti- 
cally or internationally.  The complete-markets  assumption  is not essen- 
tial,  and  our  arguments  would  go  through  in  a  fully  articulated  in- 
complete-markets  model,  for example,  one  in which  households  have 
unequal access to equity markets, so that only some hold equity (Mankiw 
and Zeldes,  1991). The home-equity-bias  puzzle  has  a strong  empirical 
basis that is independent  of any narrow theoretical framework.  The con- 
sumption  correlations  puzzle,  which  we  turn  to  next,  encompasses  a 
broader notion  of market completeness,  but its exact formulation  is also 
more model-specific. 
5.  The  International  Consumption  Correlations  Puzzle 
(Puzzle  4) 
If one  believes  that both  domestic  and international  capital markets are 
well  approximated  by an Arrow-Debreu  complete-markets  framework, 
then it is a puzzle  that international consumption  growth correlations are 
not  much  higher  than  they  appear  to be.  In an Arrow-Debreu  world, 
country-specific  output  risks should  be significantly  pooled,  and there- 
fore  domestic  per  capita  consumption  growth  should  not  depend  too 
heavily  on country-specific  income shocks.  Of course,  in some sense,  the 
consumption  correlations  puzzle  is almost  a corollary of the Feldstein- 
Horioka and home-equity-bias  puzzles.  Given that the most transparent 
market means  of consumption  smoothing-debt  and equity  trade-are 
far less operative  across borders than within  them,  it should  not come as 
any  great surprise  that international  consumption  correlations  are low. 
However,  there are many  reasons  for thinking  about consumption  cor- 
relations  independently.  One  is that we  have  only  very  imperfect  mea- 
sures of international  trade in equity  and debt,  and another is that there 
may be other market channels,  such as direct investment,  for pooling risk. 
The international consumption  correlations puzzle  has spawned  a vari- 
ety of subpuzzles.  Backus, Kehoe,  and Kydland  (1992) highlight  the fact 
that  international  output  growth  rates  are actually  more  highly  corre- 
lated than consumption  growth  rates. Backus and Smith (1993) note that 
in a world  with  traded and nontraded  goods,  efficient  risk sharing calls 
for giving  higher  rates of consumption  growth  to countries  that experi- 
ence relative drops in the real price of consumption.  (Very loosely  speak- 
ing,  the United  States and Canada should  write contracts that imply big 
transfers to Canada in states of nature where  the Canadian dollar is very 
weak  so  that Canadians  can exploit  bargain  Canadian  prices,  and  vice 
versa when  the Canadian dollar is high.) 
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quite  model-specific  (depending  on  factors  like  the  completeness  of 
markets and the exact form of the utility function),  so they are not quite 
as  obviously  puzzles  about  the  real world  in  the  same  way  that,  say, 
the  equity-home-bias  puzzle  is.  One  does  not  have  to believe  that the 
world  is  Arrow-Debreu  to  think  it  a puzzle  that  agents  do  not  take 
more advantage  of international  diversification  opportunities.  Neverthe- 
less,  consumption  correlation  puzzles  play  a  very  important  role  in 
assessing  alternative  general equilibrium models,  and,  at a more funda- 
mental  level,  we  can  ask  why  consumption  risk pooling  tends  to  be 
higher  across  regions  within  a  country's  boundaries  than  across  na- 
tional boundaries. 
5.1 THE  PUZZLE  OF LOW  INTERNATIONAL 
CONSUMPTION  CORRELATIONS 
Consider  a single-good  world  with  time-separable  preferences  in which 
all agents  have identical period utility functions  of the form u(C) =  C'-p/ 
(1  -  p).  Then,  if there  are no  trade  costs,  trade  in  a complete  set  of 
Arrow-Debreu  securities would  imply that home  and foreign consump- 
tion growth  rates are equalized: 
Ct?1  C*1  (14) 
C,  C? 
regardless  of relative shocks  to home  and foreign outputs.  (See Obstfeld 
and Rogoff,  1996, Chapter 5.) This is hardly what  one  observes  in prac- 
tice, as Table 5, which  gives  consumption  growth-rate  correlations based 
on Penn World Table data from the Group of Seven  industrial countries, 
illustrates.  The strong prediction  of equation  (14) is relaxed somewhat  in 
models  where  utility  depends  nonseparably  on both  consumption  and 
leisure.  However,  in this  case,  the benchmark  frictionless  world  econ- 
omy  model  of Backus, Kehoe,  and Kydland  (1992) still predicts  a cross- 
country consumption  correlation of almost 0.9, far above the correlations 
we  see in the table. 
Since, as we have already noted,  the low-consumption-correlation  puz- 
zle is virtually  a corollary of the previous  two puzzles  we  have  studied, 
the reader will hardly be surprised when  we note that introducing  trade 
costs works just as well in explaining  it. Indeed,  our model of the equity- 
home-bias  puzzle  can  easily  generate  correlations  of  the  sort  seen  in 
Table 5.28 
28. Lewis  (1999) points  out  that  when  a  significant  share  of  output  is  absolutely  non- 
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Table  5  CORRELATIONS  IN PER  CAPITA  PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION 
GROWTH,  1973-1992 
France  Germany  Italy  Japan  U.K.  U.S. 
Canada  0.25  0.31  0.44  0.05  0.40  0.64 
France  0.52  0.27  0.68  0.43  0.51 
Germany  0.27  0.40  0.33  0.51 
Italy  0.21  0.30  0.13 
Japan  0.59  0.50 
U.K.  0.65 
Source:  Penn World  Table.  Correlations  of log differences  in per capita  real consumption.  Simple aver- 
age of correlation  coefficients  is 0.40. 
5.2 THE  BACKUS-SMITH  PUZZLE 
Backus  and  Smith  (1993) derive  a generalization  of  equation  (14) that 
holds  when  trade is costly  and,  as a consequence,  national  price levels 
for the consumption  baskets  entering  u(C) generally  differ. Let P denote 
the home  price level and P* the foreign price level, with both price levels 
measured  in the  same  numeraire  currency. As  in the  last section,  cur- 
rency and securities  can be traded without  transport costs even  though 
goods  are costly  to  trade.  Then  complete  markets  in  state  contingent 
assets  ensure  that growth  rates in the  marginal utility  of currency-the 
medium  in which  state-contingent  insurance  payments  are made-are 
equalized  across countries.  If the utility-of-consumption  function  exhib- 
its  constant  relative  risk aversion  and  is  independent  of  leisure,  as  in 
equation  (11), that equality implies 
C-P  /  p  I  P* 




CtP/Pt  C  / Pt( 
This generalizes  equation  (14) in that P =  P* absent  international  trade 
frictions. 
Given the high volatility of real exchange  rates under floating together 
with  the low  volatility  of consumption,  it is perhaps  not surprising  that 
Backus  and  Smith's  empirical  work  forcefully  rejects  the  optimal  risk- 
sharing condition  (15). In fact, the empirical rejection of condition  (15) is 
Stockman  and  Tesar (1995) observe  that,  insofar  as the  data can be  trusted,  interna- 
tional  consumption  correlations  for  apparently  tradable  goods  are  not  appreciably 
higher  than those  for goods  generally  classified  as nontradable.  Their finding  supports 
the view  that the dichotomous  distinction  between  tradables and nontradables  is over- 
drawn,  and simultaneously  suggests  that there are substantial  impediments  to interna- 
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even more devastating,  since even very high values  of p cannot reconcile 
that condition  with  the  data.  One  possible  explanation  is that their as- 
sumption  that preferences  are separable  in consumption  and  leisure  is 
too strong,  so that one needs  to look instead  at a generalized  version  of 
(15). In our view,  however,  incompleteness  of asset markets is the major 
reason  why  condition  (15) fails so  miserably  in practice.  Indeed,  given 
the volatility  of exchange  rates,  the size  of transfers required  for (15) to 
hold  would  require a level  of risk sharing even  greater than we  observe 
in domestic  markets. 
The alert reader will note that a version  of the Backus-Smith  condition 
will hold in a dynamic  extension  of our earlier model  of the home-equity- 
bias puzzle.  That model  implicitly  assumed  flexible nominal  prices,  and 
would  not  produce  nearly  the  level  of real-exchange-rate  volatility  one 
sees  in  the  data.  We  do  not  take  this  as  damning,  since  for  us  the 
complete-markets  assumption  was  only  a useful  device  for calibration, 
and not a conviction.  Trade costs would  play essentially  the same role in 
a world  with,  say, trade in debt  and  equities  but not  a complete  set  of 
Arrow-Debreu  securities.  Indeed,  in the context of this paper, the really 
interesting  issue  is not  why  international  consumption  correlations  are 
difficult  to  replicate  in  a  complete-markets  model,  but  the  extent  to 
which  consumption  risk sharing  is less  prevalent  across  distinct  coun- 
tries than within  countries. 
5.3 INCOMPLETENESS  OF DOMESTIC  VS. 
INTERNATIONAL  MARKETS 
Certainly, empirical studies based on domestic  micro data reject resound- 
ingly the proposition  that markets are complete.  For example,  Attanasio 
and Davis  (1996) find that consumption  risk sharing is strikingly  incom- 
plete within  the United  States,  and for reasons  that apparently  are unre- 
lated to asymmetric  information.  The question  the present  paper  raises 
is whether  risk sharing  is even  more  impaired  internationally  than do- 
mestically  due to costs of specifically  international trade. Our discussion 
of home  equity bias, which  does  not rely fundamentally  on a complete- 
markets  assumption,  suggests  that  this  should  be  the  case,  since  re- 
gional equity bias seems  to be far less than the strong national home bias 
that we see in international  data. Backus and Smith's theoretical proposi- 
tion points  in the same  direction. 
A  growing  body  of  empirical  evidence  supports  the  prediction  that 
financial markets are less effective in promoting  risk sharing among coun- 
tries than among  regions within  a country. A full review of this literature 
would  take us too far afield,  but we  can mention  briefly a few  relevant 
papers.  Atkeson  and Bayoumi (1993), in one of the first empirical studies 
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are much larger than those among  the major industrial countries.  A com- 
parison  of  the  variance-decomposition  results  of Asdrubali,  Sorensen, 
and Yosha (1996) on the United States with  those  of Sorensen  and Yosha 
(1998) on the OECD suggests  that financial markets play a much bigger 
role in consumption  smoothing  among U.S. states than is the case among 
industrial  countries.  Crucini  (1999), using  an  alternative  method,  con- 
cludes  that Canadian provinces  pool  risks more effectively  than U.S.  re- 
gions,  and that either country shows  more internal risk pooling  than does 
the  sample  of industrial  countries.  Bayoumi  and  Klein (1997) find  that 
Canadian  provinces  display  more  financial  integration  with  each  other 
than with  the outside  world.29 
So there indeed  is a puzzle  as to why  intranational consumption  risk 
sharing  is  more  efficient  than  international risk sharing,  but  it can be 
resolved  in  the  same  manner  as we  have  resolved  the  home-bias  and 
Feldstein-Horioka  puzzles. 
5.4 THE  RELATIVE  CORRELATIONS  OF INTERNATIONAL 
CONSUMPTION  AND OUTPUT  GROWTH  RATES 
Backus, Kehoe  and Kydland  (1992) emphasize  the puzzle  that empirical 
consumption  correlations  are actually  lower  than  output  correlations. 
That  pattern  holds  in  the  Penn  World  Table data  analyzed  here:  the 
average  international  correlation  in per capita real GDP growth  rates is 
0.53 over 1973-1992,  while  the corresponding  average consumption  cor- 
relation is only 0.40. 
Our model,  on  its own,  does  not  offer a new  rationalization  of their 
finding.  However,  we do not consider  this to be a fundamental  problem, 
since the existence  of international  risk sharing need not generate higher 
correlation among consumptions  than outputs  across countries.  The rea- 
son  is that only  the output  remaining  after investment  and government 
consumption  can be shared by private consumers.  Thus,  a more appro- 
priate  comparison  to  assess  the  degree  of  global  risk  sharing  is  that 
between  international  consumption  correlations  and  correlations  in 
growth  rates of output  net of investment  and government  consumption 
(Y -  I -  G). Table 6 reports these  correlations for the same sample period 
and data set used  to construct Table 5. The average international correla- 
tion in the growth  of Y -  I -  G is 0.17, far below  the average correlation 
0.40 of international  consumption  growth  rates. For six of the 21 country 
pairs that ranking is reversed,  but in most of these  cases the discrepancy 
is not significant. 
So in fact, the puzzle  concerning  the relative variability of output  and 
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Table 6  CORRELATIONS IN PER CAPITA Y -  I -  G GROWTH, 1973-1992 
France  Germany  Italy  Japan  U.K.  U.S. 
Canada  0.17  0.19  0.36  -0.18  0.50  0.66 
France  0.13  0.34  0.20  0.02  0.11 
Germany  0.19  -0.19  0.13  0.18 
Italy  -0.31  0.33  0.46 
Japan  -0.25  -0.22 
U.K.  0.73 
Source:  Penn World  Table.  Correlations  of log differences  in per capita  real  GDP  net of investment  and 
government  consumption.  Simple  average  of correlation  coefficients  is 0.17. 
consumption  is not necessarily  incompatible  with a high level of interna- 
tional  asset  market  integration.  Indeed,  using  a  dynamic  new  open- 
economy  macroeconomic  model,  Chari,  Kehoe,  and  McGrattan (1998) 
are able to produce  realistic cross-country  correlations  of output  as well 
as  of consumption.30  The main  additional  assumptions  that lie behind 
their results include  sticky nominal  prices and, implicitly, transport costs 
high enough  to result in segmented  national output markets. Both trans- 
port costs  and nominal  rigidities  are central to the resolution  of the fifth 
and sixth puzzles,  to which  we  now  turn. 
6.  The  Purchasing-Power-Parity  Puzzle  (Puzzle  5) and the 
Exchange-Rate  Disconnect  Puzzle  (Puzzle  6) 
Our last two puzzles  differ from the preceding  ones  in being fundamen- 
tally  about  the  real  effects  of  a nominal  variable-the  exchange  rate, 
which  is  the  relative  price  of  currencies.  Here,  also  in  contrast  to  the 
preceding  four puzzles,  the difficulty seems  to lie primarily in explaining 
short- to medium-term  phenomena  rather than phenomena  that persist 
over very  long  periods.  (The Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle,  for example,  is 
typically  framed  using  decade-average  data).  Finally, the  last two  puz- 
zles can be viewed  as pricing puzzles,  because  they refer to price behav- 
ior, including  the dynamic  covariation between  prices and other macro- 
economic  variables. 
Any  realistic attempt to address  these  pricing puzzles  formally would 
require a much more elaborate framework than the one we have used thus 
far, incorporating,  among  other things,  elements  of monopoly  and sticky 
30. In the  Chari-Kehoe-McGrattan  sticky-price  model,  highly  correlated  national  mone- 
tary shocks  can  make  national  outputs  covary  more  closely  than  national  consump- 
tions.  Highly  correlated monetary  shocks,  however,  also tend to reduce real-exchange- 
rate variability  counterfactually  in the model. We suspect that an extended version of 
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nominal prices for goods  and/or labor. In fact, there is already a great deal 
of exciting research along these  lines now  taking place [see, for example, 
the  recent  survey  by  Lane  (2001)  on  the  new  open-economy  macro- 
economics].  Unfortunately,  we do not have nearly enough  space remain- 
ing here to present  a fully articulated model.  Nevertheless,  we will try to 
make clear why trade costs are as essential to resolving  the pricing puzzles 
as they are to resolving  puzzles  1 through 4, which  are quantity puzzles. 
The  first pricing  puzzle  we  take  up  is  the  purchasing-power-parity 
(PPP) puzzle  (Rogoff, 1996), which  highlights  just how weak the connec- 
tion is between  exchange  rates and national  price levels.  It is based  on 
the observation  that in hundreds  of studies,  using  widely  varying  tech- 
niques  and data sets,  researchers have  repeatedly  found  very long half- 
lives-on  the  order of 3 to 4 years-for  shocks  to real (CPI) exchange 
rates. As we shall explain, half-lives  of this magnitude  are hard to under- 
stand  if financial-market  disturbances  with  only  transitory  real effects 
are very important in explaining  short-run volatility. 
Our term for the  second  pricing  puzzle  is the exchange-rate  disconnect 
puzzle, a name that alludes  broadly to the exceedingly  weak relationship 
(except,  perhaps,  in  the  longer  run)  between  the  exchange  rate  and 
virtually any macroeconomic  aggregates.  It manifests  itself in a variety of 
ways.  For  example,  Meese  and  Rogoff  (1983)  showed  that  standard 
macroeconomic  exchange-rate  models,  even  with  the aid of ex post data 
on the  fundamentals,  forecast  exchange  rates at short to medium  hori- 
zons  no better  than  a naive  random  walk.  Baxter and Stockman  (1989) 
argued  that transitions  to floating-exchange-rate  regimes  lead  to sharp 
increases  in nominal-  and  real-exchange-rate  variability  with  no  corre- 
sponding  changes  in  the  distributions  of fundamental  macroeconomic 
variables.31 (The PPP puzzle  is really just an example,  albeit a very impor- 
tant one,  of the broader exchange-rate  disconnect  puzzle.) 
A  critical difference  between  the  (relatively  short-term)  pricing  puz- 
zles  and  the  (longer-term)  quantity  puzzles  is  that  we  can  no  longer 
appeal  to  high  elasticities  of  substitution  to  lever  up  the  effects  of 
modest-sized  trade costs.  (At the very least,  the connection  is no longer 
as simple  and  direct.)  If there  are only  modest  obstacles  to short-term 
price arbitrage across borders, there can be only modest  short-term price 
differentials.  In fact, at the consumer  level,  arbitrage costs are likely to be 
rather large,  and,  after all,  most  goods  embody  very  large nontraded 
content  once  they  reach  consumers  at the  retail level.  But one  cannot 
make this argument  for wholesale  importers who  trade in bulk,  so here 
31. Flood  and  Rose  (1995)  extend  Baxter  and  Stockman's  results  and  arrive  at  similar 
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we  need  a more  nuanced  discussion.  As  we  shall  see,  importer-level 
prices  do appear to exhibit  somewhat  less  anomalous  behavior  than do 
consumer-level  prices. 
6.1 THE  PPP PUZZLE 
Let Q be the real exchange  rate between  two countries,  and consider  the 
regression  equation 
log Qt =  a  +  7qt  +  y log Qt-1 +  E,, 
where  et is a random  disturbance.  The real exchange  rate, Q, is defined 
as  WP*/P using  overall  CPI  data  for  price  levels,  where  the  nominal 
exchange  rate % is the  price of foreign  currency  in terms  of home  cur- 
rency. (In deference  to conventional  usage,  we now  switch  notation  and 
use P to denote  the domestic  price level measured  in home  currency and 
P* the foreign price level measured  in foreign currency.) 
Using  monthly  1973-1995  data for Canada,  France, Germany,  Japan, 
and  the  United  States,  and  constructing  all  10 possible  real exchange 
rates  in  this  sample,  we  find  values  of  y  ranging  from  0.99  (U.S.- 
Canada,  implying  a  half-life  of  69  months)  to  0.97  (Germany-Japan, 
implying  a half-life  of 21 months).  The mean  half-life  across these  real 
exchange  rates is around  39 months,  or 3- years.32 
Such  long  half-lives  would  not  necessarily  be  a puzzle  but  for  the 
remarkable volatility  of real and nominal  exchange  rates, volatility  that 
seems  hard to explain  without  assigning  a major role to monetary  and 
financial shocks.  If monetary  and financial  shocks  are the predominant 
source  of volatility, however,  it is hard to imagine  what  source  of nomi- 
nal rigidity could be so persistent  as to explain  the prolongation  of real- 
exchange-rate  deviations.  This is the PPP puzzle. 
6.2 THE PPP PUZZLE  FOR  TRADABLES  VERSUS  NONTRADABLES 
One  might  think that the slow  mean  reversion  just documented  applies 
primarily  to  goods  with  extremely  high  international  trade  costs, 
whereas,  at least  for goods  that  are heavily  traded,  mean  reversion  in 
relative  international  consumer  prices  might  be more  rapid. That is not 
the case,  however,  as documented  most strikingly by Engel (1999). 
If we  are willing  to  set  our  qualms  aside  temporarily  and  adopt  a 
conventional  dichotomy  of  traded  versus  nontraded  consumer  goods, 
we  can use Figure 3 to illustrate the empirical significance  of the distinc- 
32. Data on  end-of-month  nominal  exchange  rates and  on  consumer  price indexes  come 
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tion  for real-exchange-rate  dynamics.  The  figure  is based  on  monthly 
1962-1995  data from Engel (1999, Section I) for the United States, France, 
Germany,  and Japan. The overall real exchange  rate Q =  WP*/P  is com- 
pared with  relative price indexes  for tradables and nontradables,  *P~/PT 
and  fPN/PN, where  we  adopt  Engel's  disaggregation  of OECD sectoral 
CPI data into tradable and nontradable  subindexes.33 Each panel  of the 
figure  plots  the  correlations  of  percentage  changes  between  pairs  of 
relative  prices,  where  the  number  of  months  over  which  the  data  are 
differenced  is measured  on the horizontal  axis. 
Consistent  with  Engel's  results,  the  data reveal  no  significant  differ- 
ence  between  short-term  and  long-term  correlations,  indicating  ex- 
tremely slow  mean reversion  in shocks to the relative prices of tradables. 
Interestingly,  it seems  to make  rather little  difference  whether  we  use 
tradables or nontradables  prices to compute  real exchange  rates: all the 
price ratios are highly  correlated with each other even  out to horizons  of 
five years.  Engel's results focused  on the U.S.  real exchange  rate against 
various  trading partners,  but as one  can see from the figure,  the results 
are (almost) as striking for a pairing of Germany and Japan. Other non- 
U.S.  pairings  that we have examined  look similar. 
We have argued  that the traded-nontraded-goods  distinction  is much 
too finely  drawn-at  the retail level,  many  "traded" goods  already em- 
body  very  large  nontraded  components,  and  the  dividing  line  is arbi- 
trary and likely endogenous.  It is nevertheless  surprising just how  little 
difference  there is between  the measures  of real exchange  rates in Figure 
3. These  findings  probably cannot be ascribed merely  to price aggrega- 
tion problems,  since many researchers report similar sluggish  responses 
even  for relatively  disaggregated  data on consumer  goods  that are com- 
monly  perceived  as highly  tradable. (See, for example,  Isard, 1977; Gio- 
vannini,  1988; and Engel and Rogers, 1996.) The results certainly seem to 
suggest  that even over the medium  term, the consumer  prices of suppos- 
edly  tradable  goods  are nearly  as insulated  from the  forces  of interna- 
tional arbitrage as are the consumer  prices of nontradables. 
6.3 ADJUSTMENT  IS FASTER  AT  THE  PRODUCER  LEVEL 
It is important  to emphasize  that there  seems  to be  considerably  more 
adjustment  of prices to exchange-rate  changes  at the importer level than 
at the consumer  level. In their excellent  survey  of the empirical literature 
on exchange  rates and international  prices, Goldberg  and Knetter (1997) 
conclude  that the passthrough  of exchange  rates to relative international 
prices is about 50% after one  year, much  faster than what  we  have just 
33. See Appendix A of Engel (1999).  Figure  3 looks much the same if attention  is restricted 
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seen  in  the  consumer-price  data.  Thus,  relatively  large  elasticities  in 
international  trade between  exporters  and  importers  can be  consistent 
with  exceedingly  sluggish  adjustment  in the  relative  consumer  prices  of 
tradables. 
Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (2000) observe  that if this were  not  the  case-if 
prices  paid  by  importers  moved  as  sluggishly  as  prices  paid  by  con- 
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sumers-a  country's  terms  of trade  would  actually  improve,  rather  than 
worsen,  after  a depreciation  of the  exchange  rate.  For example,  if the  dol- 
lar depreciates  against  the  pound  and  all prices  are sticky,  the  dollar  price 
paid  by  Americans  for British  goods  remains  fixed  whereas  the  price  paid 
by  British  citizens  for American  goods  rises when  translated  into  dollars. 
They  find  that  this  does  not  seem  to be  the  case  empirically,  and  instead 378 *  OBSTFELD  & ROGOFF 
find significant support for the conventional  view-that  exchange-rate de- 
preciation  worsens  the term of trade of the depreciating  country. 
6.4 TRADE  COSTS  AND PRICING  TO MARKET 
Whereas  the home  bias in trade could,  in principle,  be explained  simply 
by a home  bias in preferences,  the failure of markets to arbitrage interna- 
tional price differentials  for seemingly  identical  goods  cannot.  The most 
popular  explanation  of persistent  international  price differentials  argues 
that most goods  are supplied  monopolistically,  and that (by assumption) 
monopoly  producers  have very broad scope to price to market  by charging 
different  prices  in home  and  foreign  markets  (see,  for example,  Dorn- 
busch,  1987; Krugman,  1987;  Betts  and  Devereux,  1996;  Bergin  and 
Feenstra,  2000; or  Devereux  and  Engel,  2000).  Goldberg  and  Knetter 
(1997) survey  a large body  of supportive  empirical evidence. 
This explanation  of international  price differences  for very  similar or 
identical goods  is appealing,  but incomplete.  What is to prevent consum- 
ers  from  arbitraging  between  home  and  foreign  prices?  Any  explana- 
tion-and  the  pricing-to-market  literature  offers many;  see  Dornbusch 
(1987)-has  to be  consistent  with  the  tenuous  connection  between  ex- 
change  rates and  the  relative  prices for virtually  any  type  of consumer 
good.  Rationales  for pricing  to  market  that might  make  sense  for big- 
ticket items such  as cars (the steering  wheels  on American  and Japanese 
cars are on opposite  sides,  dealers  can refuse warranty service  for vehi- 
cles purchased  abroad, etc.) are not very appealing  when  applied to, say, 
basic clothing  items. 
In our view,  trade costs simply must play a central role in any explana- 
tion  of international  price differentials.  However,  to make  sense  of the 
price data, we  must  refine our earlier discussion  of trade costs to distin- 
guish  between  bulk wholesale  and individual  consumer  trade costs.  We 
must  also think carefully about the ability of producers  to control inter- 
national  distribution  chains  at the  wholesale  level.  Otherwise-if  the 
only  wedge  between  home  and  foreign  markets  were  moderate  trade 
costs-one  would  only observe  moderate  price differentials. 
6.5 WHOLESALE  BULK  VS. RETAIL  INDIVIDUAL 
TRANSSHIPPING  COSTS 
At the consumer  level,  it is likely that for many goods,  trading costs are 
in  fact quite  large,  and  far, far larger than  trading  costs  faced  by bulk 
wholesale  shippers.  (Individual  consumers  cannot  profitably  arbitrage 
even  large  differences  in  Coca-Cola  prices  across  countries,  but  bulk 
wholesalers  can.) The real question  is what  prevents  international  price 
arbitrage at the wholesale  level.  One answer is that in many cases,  a firm The Six Major Puzzles in International  Macroeconomics  *  379 
can establish legal rights to control distribution  of its product in different 
countries.  Exclusive national marketing licenses  are extremely  common. 
For example,  to protect its ability to price-discriminate  across home  and 
foreign  markets,  the Coca-Cola company  sued  a couple  of small Ameri- 
can wholesalers  who,  during the late 1990s, were  trying to arbitrage the 
difference  between  Coca-Cola's  $11.50-per-case wholesale  price in Japan 
(as of January 2000) and its wholesale  $5.50-per-case  price in the United 
States-a  differential  far in  excess  of  bulk  shipping  costs.34 True,  for 
small firms, the costs of establishing  sole country distribution  rights, and 
even more the legal costs of enforcing  such rights, are likely to be prohibi- 
tive.  Such firms also are likely to deal only with  a very small number  of 
bulk wholesalers,  however,  so it is still quite possible  that they can price- 
discriminate,  either  by  exploiting  long-term  relationships  with  their 
downstream  wholesalers  or even  by taking  over more portions  of their 
wholesale  distribution  network. 
6.6 PRICING  TO MARKET  AND THE  PPP PUZZLE 
To explain  the data adequately,  one must  flesh  out many  details that we 
are omitting here. Very simple models  of the kind we used in the first four 
sections  are simply not adequate.  For example,  it is well known  that with 
constant elasticities  of demand,  a monopolist  may charge different prices 
in different  countries,  but exchange-rate  changes  will not cause fluctua- 
tions in relative prices charged [see Dornbusch  (1987) and Marston (1990) 
for partial equilibrium  models,  and Betts and Devereux  (1996), Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1996, Chapter  10), and Hau (2000a) for general equilibrium 
models].  The nature of price rigidities  is also quite important; Devereux 
and  Engel  (2000) emphasize  that to make  sense  of the  consumer-price 
data, one must think of final consumer goods prices as being sticky largely 
in domestic-currency  terms  for both  domestically  produced  goods  and 
importables. 
Once one allows  for pricing to market, however,  it does become  possi- 
ble to develop  models  that can generate  large price differentials  exhibit- 
ing  considerable  persistence.  Leading  examples  of  such  models  are in 
Bergin  and  Feenstra  (2001) and  Chari,  Kehoe,  and  McGrattan  (1998), 
both of which  develop  new  open-economy  macroeconomic  models  with 
rich price dynamics.  These  authors  do  not  explicitly  base  their models 
on trade costs-they  do not try to rationalize  the existence  of pricing to 
market, but just assume  it-so  trade costs are only implicit. An example 
of  a  model  with  explicit  trade  costs  is  given  by  Dumas  (1992),  who 
observes  that moderate  trade costs  can generate  real-exchange-rate  per- 
34. See Constance  L. Hays,  "In Japan, What Price Coca-Cola?" New York  Times, January 26, 
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sistence  even  in a competitive  world  of fully  flexible  prices.  However, 
the  Dumas  model  cannot  simultaneously  generate  anywhere  near  the 
volatility  and  persistence  needed  to  match  the  data.  Monopoly  and 
nominal  rigidities  appear  to be  essential  elements  of any  resolution  of 
the PPP puzzle.35 
Finally, one should  note that in the presence  of trade costs, econometric 
estimates  of the half-life  of real-exchange-rate  movements  may be exag- 
gerated.  Price differentials  dissipate  very  slowly  within  transaction-cost 
bands,  but more quickly outside  them,  and proper econometric  estima- 
tion should  take these  nonlinearities  into  account  (see Michael,  Nobay, 
and Peel,  1997; Obstfeld  and Taylor, 1997; and Taylor, 2001).36 
6.7 THE  EXCHANGE-RATE  DISCONNECT  PUZZLE 
The same  reasoning  we  have  applied  to thinking  about the PPP puzzle 
can  be  applied  to  a  much  broader  range  of  puzzles,  all  relating  to 
the  remarkably weak  short-term  feedback  links  between  the  exchange 
rate and the rest of the economy.  We term this broader class of puzzles 
the exchange-rate  disconnect  puzzle. In a sense,  the PPP puzzle  is simply  a 
very  important  special  example  of this broader class of phenomena.  Of 
course,  one  may  well  ask  why  the  exchange-rate  disconnect  puzzle 
should  be any different  from the stock-price  disconnect  puzzle, that is,  the 
fact that stock markets seem  to gyrate wildly  without  having  any sizable 
contemporaneous  effects  on  the  real economy.  We ourselves  (Obstfeld 
and Rogoff,  1996, Chapter 9) have  argued  that to understand  exchange- 
rate volatility,  one  ultimately  needs  a broader  model  that explains  the 
high  volatility  we  seem  to  observe  in  all asset  markets.  While  we  still 
maintain  that view,  it is also  true that the  links  between  the  exchange 
rate and the real economy  are much more direct than for stock prices.  In 
most  economies,  the exchange  rate is the single  most important relative 
price,  one  that potentially  feeds  back immediately  into a large range of 
transactions.  Because  the  potential  links  are so  direct,  it is  surprising 
indeed  that they are not stronger. 
Though  much work remains to be done,  it appears to us that a frame- 
work  such  as  the  one  we  have  outlined  earlier in  this  section  (under 
puzzle  5) holds  great potential  for explaining  the other disconnect  puz- 
zles  as well.  For example,  exchange  rates are remarkably volatile relative 
to any model  we have of underlying  fundamentals  such as interest rates, 
35. Working in a competitive  flexible-price model with transport costs,  Ravn and Mazzenga 
(1999) are also unable  to rationalize  both the real-exchange-rate  volatility  and the real- 
exchange-rate  persistence  in the data. Ohanian and Stockman (1997) develop  an explor- 
atory theoretical model  of trade costs in a flexible-price  monetary  model. 
36. Rogoff  (1996) posits  trading-cost  bands  as an essential  element  of any explanation  of 
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outputs,  and  money  supplies,  and no  model  seems  to be very  good  at 
explaining  exchange  rates even  ex post.  The traditional  thinking  is that 
even  though  a broad  range  of  goods  is  nontraded,  there  is  always  a 
broad range of goods  that are traded,  and these  tie down  the exchange 
rate. But a recurring theme  here is that markets for most "traded" goods 
are not fully integrated,  and segmentation  due to various trade costs can 
be  quite  pervasive.  In fact, the  spectrum  of goods  subject to low  trade 
costs may be very narrow. 
In the  type  of model  we  described  earlier in this  section,  a financial- 
market  shock  that  moves  the  exchange  rate may  have  little  economic 
effect even  over  a fairly long horizon.  With pervasive  pricing to market 
at the retail level,  consumers  will be largely insulated  from exchange-rate 
effects until these have had the time to feed through to wholesale  import 
prices  and,  from there,  to retailers.  The magnitude  of the  PPP puzzle 
suggests  how  long that process  might  take. 
Thus,  interacting  with  the segmentation  caused  by trade costs,  nomi- 
nal price rigidities  can produce  a disconnect  in which  the exchange  rate 
responds  wildly  to shocks.  With the prices of most  goods  preset in local 
currency and real variables such as aggregate  consumption  largely insu- 
lated  from exchange  rates in the  short run,  exchange-rate  adjustments 
have minimal  short-run economic  effects and therefore must be huge  to 
clear financial markets.  Only  gradually  will  the  responses  of importers 
and  exporters  feed  through  to  the  retail  level-and  the  adjustments 
might well be too slow  to be picked up in the kinds of tests performed  by 
Baxter and  Stockman  (1989). High  volatility  and the  exchange-rate  dis- 
connect  therefore  both  result  from  a combination  of trade  costs  (costs 
that are especially  high for consumers),  monopoly,  and pricing to market 
in  local  currency. A  full  model  would  incorporate  those  factors,  while 
also  modeling  fully  the  dynamics  of  price  adjustment  through  retail 
distribution  networks,  as  well  as  other  channels  through  which  ex- 
change  rates might  affect the real economy.37 
We do  not  have  space  to explore  the  many  implications  that this  in- 
triguing  class of models  suggests.  Can heightened  exchange-rate  volatil- 
ity due to transport costs act to further segment  markets internationally, 
with  a resulting  multiplier  effect  on  volatility?38 What  are the  welfare 
37. Engel (1996) proposes  that if all consumer  prices are preset in local currency and firms 
fully hedge  currency risks, exchange-rate  changes  will have  no real effects  and there- 
fore exchange  rates will be indeterminate.  Hau (2000b) develops  a new  open-economy 
macroeconomic  model  in which  exchange-rate  volatility  is decreasing  in the degree  of 
openness  to international  trade. 
38. The  theoretical  work  of Bacchetta and  van  Wincoop  (1998) and  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff 
(1998,  2000)  and  the  empirical  work  of  Obstfeld  and  Taylor (1997) and  Rose  (2000) 
suggest  that currency volatility  may itself act as a barrier to international  trade. 382 *  OBSTFELD & ROGOFF 
costs  of the exchange-rate  disconnect?  But the general  approach  strikes 
us  as  a  very  promising  and  realistic  way  to  think  about  a  host  of 
exchange-rate  volatility puzzles. 
7. Conclusions 
The need  for research on the effects  of trade costs in standard models  of 
international  finance  seems  compelling  to us.  We find that introducing 
plausible proportional (iceberg) trade costs into the most standard interna- 
tional  macroeconomics  models  substantially  resolves  many  of the  core 
empirical puzzles  in the field, including especially the (seemingly  intracta- 
ble)  Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle,  the  home-bias-in-equities  puzzle,  the 
home-bias-in-trade  puzzle,  and  the  low-consumption-correlations  puz- 
zle.  We cannot  claim the  same  degree  of success  in elucidating  pricing 
puzzles  as in the case of quantity puzzles,  at least not with the kind of very 
simple  models  we  have  featured here.  To tackle the PPP puzzle  and the 
exchange-rate  disconnect  puzzle  properly, a much richer framework fea- 
turing imperfect  competition  and wage-price  rigidities  is needed  (there- 
fore  one  in  which,  at a very  fundamental  level,  neither  domestic  nor 
international  markets are perfect). It is also necessary  to build in a distinc- 
tion between  retail and wholesale  pricing to account for the sharply differ- 
ent  behavior  of  terms-of-trade  indexes  vs.  consumer  price  indexes  in 
response  to exchange-rate  changes  (see Obstfeld  and Rogoff,  2000, and 
Tille, 2000). We have  argued,  however,  that introducing  trade costs  (im- 
plicitly or explicitly) must be an essential ingredient  in resolving  the inter- 
national pricing puzzles  as well.  Richer models  might consider fixed costs 
of trade as well as the proportional costs on which we have focused here.39 
Although  we  take an eclectic  perspective  on the  degree  of complete- 
ness  of international  capital markets,  our analysis  does  not  rely on  the 
assumption  that their performance  is intrinsically  inferior to that of do- 
mestic  capital  markets  (at least  not  in  analyzing  data  for OECD coun- 
tries).  Our  focus,  instead,  is  on  the  distinctive  ramifications  for asset- 
market performance  of the  imperfect  integration  of goods markets.  One 
attractive feature of our approach is that it is entirely consistent  with  the 
observation  that gross  flows  in international  capital markets  are much 
larger than the small net flows. 
An  obvious  potential  criticism  of our central theme  is that transport 
technology  has been  steadily  improving  over the past half century, and 
tariffs have  fallen  dramatically,  especially  among  the  OECD countries. 
Has the home  bias in trade and equities  lessened,  and are the consump- 
39. O'Connell and Wei (1997) give an example of a theoretical  model of price arbitrage 
involving fixed as well as variable  costs. The  Six Major  Puzzles  in International  Macroeconomics  *  383 
tion-correlations  and  Feldstein-Horioka  puzzles  less  acute  than  they 
were  half a century  ago? The short  answer  is that trade,  capital move- 
ments,  and equity flows all have  expanded  sharply since 1950, so the major 
quantity  puzzles  are less  acute.  For example,  the ratio of total trade (the 
sum  of  imports  and  exports)  to  GDP  has  roughly  doubled  across  the 
OECD between  1950 and 1995; for the United States, it has risen from 9% 
in  1950 to 24% in 1995.40 (This calculation  may  significantly  understate 
the true growth rate, since a large fraction of trade is in manufactures,  the 
relative  price  of  which  has  been  falling  over  time.)  And,  as  we  have 
already seen,  OECD savings-investment  correlations have fallen signifi- 
cantly (from 0.89 for 1960-1974  to 0.60 for 1990-1997),  while  holdings  of 
foreign equity have risen sharply (for the United States, from a 4% share 
in 1987 to a 10%  share in 1996). At the same time, while transport technol- 
ogy  has  steadily  improved,  labor costs  have  risen  sharply,  so  there  is 
actually some debate about whether net transport costs have fallen. Hum- 
mels  (1999b) argues  that,  until recently, the overall  effect has been  rela- 
tively small, with shipping  costs falling sharply for bulk commodities  but 
actually  rising for manufactures,  which  account  for over  70% of OECD 
trade.  Greenspan  (1989),  on  the  other  hand,  emphasizes  that  trade  is 
getting  lighter, as many of the goods  and services being traded today are 
highly  knowledge-intensive.  Overall,  the  data for the past half century 
certainly do not provide  any prima facie case against  our approach. 
It would  be interesting  to look at time spans beyond  just the past fifty 
years,  so  that  trend  declines  in  trade  costs  become  more  pronounced. 
Williamson  (2000)  calculates  that  transport  costs  for  internationally 
traded  goods  fell by  1.5% per  annum  in real terms  from 1850 to  1913, 
with the rate slowing  down  substantially  over 1913-1950.  Although  pre- 
war data are much  thinner  than postwar,  and although  there are many 
other factors to control for (large fluctuations  in tariff rates,  decoloniza- 
tion,  wars,  changes  in  the  international  monetary  regime,  etc.),  this 
would  nevertheless  be a useful  exercise.  Cross-sectional  empirical work 
is also needed. 
Finally, a small  apology  to readers who  were  expected  us  also  to ad- 
dress the forward-premium  puzzle.  We simply  have not yet tackled this 
particular  pricing  puzzle,  which  we  regard  as  much  more  of  a pure 
finance  question  than  a macroeconomic  puzzle  (and hence  this paper's 
title). We note,  however,  that Dumas  (1992) has produced  a model of the 
forward premium  in which  trade costs  do pull in the right direction,  so 
getting  a trade-cost model  with  the right quantitative  effects may indeed 
be possible. 
40. The  only  outliers  are Australia  and  Japan,  with  trade  ratios  that  remained  roughly 
constant  between  1950 and 1995 at 40% and 19%, respectively.  See Baldwin and Martin 
(1999) or World Bank, World  Development  Report, 1995. 384 *  OBSTFELD & ROGOFF 
Appendix 
Table  7 presents  saving  and  investment  rates  by  country  for  1990-1997. 
Table 7  SAVING AND  INVESTMENT RATES, 1990-1997 
Country  NS/Ya  I/yb  OECDC 
Switzerland  0.29  0.23  1 
Japan  0.33  0.30  1 
Norway  0.27  0.23  1 
Singapore  0.50  0.36 
Denmark  0.17  0.15  1 
Iceland  0.16  0.17  1 
United  States  0.15  0.17  1 
Germany  0.21  0.22  1 
Austria  0.23  0.24  1 
Belgium  0.22  0.18  1 
Sweden  0.15  0.16  1 
France  0.20  0.19  1 
Netherlands  0.25  0.21  1 
Finland  0.18  0.18  1 
United  Kingdom  0.14  0.15  1 
Australia  0.17  0.22  1 
Italy  0.19  0.19  1 
Canada  0.16  0.18  1 
Ireland  0.21  0.19  1 
Countries  with  GNP/cap.d >  18,000 (ave.)  0.22  0.21 
New  Zealand  0.16  0.19  1 
Israel  0.07  0.24 
Spain  0.20  0.22  1 
Greece  0.15  0.17  1 
Korea  0.35  0.37 
Portugal  0.22  0.22  1 
Countries  with  GNP/cap.  5000-18,000  (ave.)  0.19  0.24 
Saudi Arabia  0.28e  0.21 
Uruguay  0.12  0.13 
Chile  0.21  0.25 
Malaysia  0.33  0.39 
Trinidad and Tobago  0.18f  0.16 
Mauritius  0.24  0.29 
Mexico  0.19  0.23 
Venezuela  0.22  0.17 
Turkey  0.20  0.21 
Panama  0.23  0.25 The Six Major Puzzles in International  Macroeconomics  *  385 
Table 7  continued 
Country  NS/Ya  I/Yb  OECDC 
Thailand  0.34f  0.41 
Costa Rica  0.21  0.27 
Iran, I.R. of  0.26  0.27 
Colombia  0.18  0.21 
Namibia  0.15  0.21 
Tunisia  0.17  0.27 
Paraguay  0.12  0.23 
Countries  with  GNP/cap.  2000-5000  (ave.)  0.21  0.24 
El Salvador  0.01  0.17 
Dominican  Republic  0.13  0.23 
Ecuador  0.16  0.20 
Jordan  0.01  0.32 
Guatemala  0.07g  0.15 
Morocco  0.18  0.22 
Philippines  0.17  0.23 
Sri Lanka  0.14  0.25 
Zimbabwe  0.14f  0.21 
Honduras  0.17  0.30 
Pakistan  0.16  0.19 
Zambia  0.10  0.24 
Kenya  0.13  0.20 
Burkina Faso  0.07  0.24 
Malawi  0.01  0.18 
Countries  with  GNP/cap.  <  2000 (ave.)  0.11  0.22 
All countries  (average)  0.19  0.22 
aNS/Y: gross  national  saving/gross  domestic  product,  averaged  over  1990-1997.  For OECD countries, 
data on  NS and  Y are from the OECD database.  For non-OECD  countries,  NS was  constructed,  from 
International Financial Statistics (IMF), as  follows:  NS  =  GNP  -  private  consumption  -  government 
consumption.  Our  measure  of  NS  for  non-OECD  countries  does  not  exactly  match  the  theoretical 
definition.  The main  difference  is that it does  not take account  of the balance-of-payments  component 
"net current transfers from abroad." Most of the countries  that report data to the IMF and are not in the 
sample  were excluded  for one of four reasons: (1) IFS has data only for GDP and not GNP; (2) there are 
no IFS data on inventory  investment;  (3) there is a significant  statistical discrepancy  either between  GDP 
and  its  components  (more  than  3%), or between  GNP  and  the  sum  of  GDP  and  net  factor income/ 
payments  from abroad (more than 2%); (4) population  is under  1 million. 
I/Y: investment/GDP,  average  over  1990-1997.  Investment  is the sum  of gross  fixed capital formation 
and increase  (decrease)  in inventory  stocks.  Sources  are as in note a. 
CThe  OECD sample  of countries  includes  those  that were members  in 1995. 
dGNP per capita measured  in U.S.  dollars,  for 1997. 
eNo data for 1996 and 1997. 
fNo  data for 1997. 
gNo  data for 1991. 386 * OBSTFELD & ROGOFF 
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1. Introduction 
One  of the pleasures  in reading  this paper  is that it has  the  flavor of a 
conspiracy  theory. It explains  a set of apparently  unconnected  and unex- 
plained phenomena  in terms of a single cause,  which,  the authors argue, 
is not as implausible  as it sounds.  And  they succeed  at least in instilling 
doubts-this  on the basis of careful theoretical  reasoning  and some  em- 
pirical evidence.  This is a thought-provoking  paper, which  I expect to be 
influential  and  inspire  a number  of theoretical  and  empirical papers:  it 
raises a number  of hypotheses  that are both theoretically  intriguing  and 
potentially  testable. 
The  thesis  in  this  paper  is  that  the  main  puzzles  in  international 
macroeconomics  can be  explained  as the  result  of costs  in the  trade of 
goods  and  services.  The  paper  nicely  weaves  together  empirical  evi- 
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goods  and  services.  The  paper  nicely  weaves  together  empirical  evi- Comment 391 
dence  and theoretical  arguments,  some  of which  are explicitly  modeled 
with  the  pedagogic  elegance  that  is  one  of  the  authors'  trademarks. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (OR) start with the rather uncontroversial  point that 
trade  costs  can  generate  a  significant  degree  of  segmentation  in  the 
goods  market, before  moving  to the more provocative  part of their the- 
sis: the international  segmentation  of asset markets could result from the 
same trade costs.  In other words,  it might be unnecessary  to invoke  the 
many  frictions specific  to the asset markets that have been  discussed  in 
the literature.1 
I  shall  focus  my  comments  on  the  Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle,  the 
international-consumption-correlation  puzzle,  and the exchange-rate dis- 
connect puzzle,  since this is where OR are more innovative  and provoca- 
tive. It is rather uncontroversial  in principle that trade costs can generate 
a significant  degree  of international  segmentation  in the goods  market, 
especially  if  goods  are sufficiently  substitutable  and  if trade  costs  are 
defined  in  a sufficiently  broad  way.  OR go  beyond  this  theoretical  re- 
mark, and convincingly  argue,  on the basis  of estimates  for transporta- 
tion  costs  and  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  goods,  that  trade 
costs  can explain  a large degree  of international  segmentation  in trade. 
An  important  challenge,  for the  scholars  who  will  pursue  this  line  of 
reasoning,  will be to refine the mapping  between  the various trade costs 
(distinguishing,  in particular, between  those  that are border-related  and 
those that are not) and the pattern of trade segmentation  that we observe 
in the real world. 
2.  Explaining  Asset  Market  Segmentation  by Trade  Costs 
OR's  discussion  of  the  different  channels  by  which  frictions  can  spill 
over from goods  markets to asset markets is truly impressive  in its theo- 
retical breadth and originality  of insight.  I shall restrict the scope  of my 
comments  to the two  channels  which  OR have  chosen  to model  explic- 
itly. The first model  is presented  by OR in connection  with the Feldstein- 
Horioka  puzzle;  it relies  on  an  implicit  wedge  in  the  real-interest-rate 
parity condition.  The second  model  attempts  to explain the home  bias in 
equity portfolios; it looks at the implication  of nontraded  goods  for port- 
folio choice. 
1. The home bias in equity portfolios has been attributed  to informational  asymmetries 
(Kang  and Stulz, 1994;  Portes  and Rey, 1999),  cultural  and linguistic  barriers,  and differ- 
ences in national tax systems and regulations (Tesar  and Werner, 1995). Kraay and 
Ventura  (1999)  show that in a portfolio  perspective  the Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle can be 
viewed as a direct  consequence  of the home bias in asset portfolios. 392 *  JEANNE 
The link between  nontraded  goods  and portfolio choice is the object of 
a growing  literature, which  is difficult to review  in a short space.  Let me 
simply  note that this literature may seem a bit less optimistic,  in its most 
recent developments,  than OR in this paper. In her recent review, Lewis 
(1999) underlines  several  shortcomings  of  the  approach;  in  particular, 
she argues that a key prediction  of OR's Section 4 model-that  investors 
hold  a  globally  diversified  portfolio  of  traded-good  industries,  but 
nontraded-good  industries  are held  entirely  domestically-is  not  sup- 
ported  by  casual  empiricism.  Pesenti  and  Van Wincoop  (1996) apply  a 
model  of  optimal  portfolio  choice  with  nontraded  goods  to  fourteen 
OECD countries,  and find that it can explain  only a small fraction of the 
home  bias.  The model  presented  here by OR differs from the previous 
literature by assuming  a trade cost which  applies  to all domestic  output, 
rather than  drawing  an  arbitrary line  between  tradables  and  nontrad- 
ables.  It remains  to be seen  whether  endogenizing  the frontier between 
traded and nontraded  goods  significantly  improves  the model's  ability to 
explain  the home  bias in equity portfolios. 
I was  more  intrigued  by the  first channel,  "an entirely  new  explana- 
tion,  based  on transaction  costs  for international  trade in goods,"  (Sec- 
tion 3.1) and shall spend,  accordingly,  the rest of this section  comment- 
ing on it. 
2.1 TRADE  COSTS  AND INTERTEMPORAL  PRICE  WEDGES: 
A ONE-GOOD  MODEL 
In their explanation  of the Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle  OR present  a model 
of the consumption-saving  choice  in a small  open  economy  with  trade 
costs.  First, let me rephrase OR's main point in the context of a one-good 
model  (this is the limit of their two-good  model where  the two goods  are 
perfectly  substitutable).  The one-good  model  is less  general  but makes 
the  logic  of OR's point  more  transparent.2 I keep  the  same  notation  as 
OR except that the subscripts  denoting  the difference between  home  and 
foreign  goods  are dropped.  For convenience,  the representative  agent's 
psychological  discount  rate  is  assumed  to  be  equal  to  the  world  real 
interest  rate. 
The good  can be exported  to or imported  from a global perfectly com- 
petitive  market,  where  its price,  P*, is fixed  in terms of the  world  cur- 
rency unit.  Because a fraction T  of the good  "melts" in transit, the home 
price of the good  (where home  means  net of trade costs) is given  by 
2. The one-good  model  was  presented  in the first version  of OR's paper,  although  not in 
the same way  as I am presenting  it here. Comment  393 
P* 
f =  if the  country  imports  (Ct >  Yt), 
1-T 
Pt  E  (1 -  T)P*,  if the trade balance is equal to zero (Ct =  Y), 
1 -T 
=  (1 -  T)P*  if the country exports  (Ct <  Y). 
The  home  price  of  the  good  is  a  discontinuous  function  of  domestic 
consumption.  It jumps  down  when  the  trade balance  switches  from a 
deficit to a surplus. 
The first-period and second-period  budget  constraints are respectively 
given  by  P1(C, -  Y,)  =  D  and  P2(Y2 -  C2) =  (1  +  r*)D, where  D  is 
borrowing  from  abroad  in  world  currency  units.  The  domestic 
consumption-saving  problem  thus can be written 
max  u(C1) +  3u(C2) 
C2  Y2  s.t.  C1 +  =Y1 + 
(1 + r*)(P1/P2)  (1 + r*)(Pl/P2) 
The  representative  consumer's  intertemporal  budget  constraint  is  de- 
picted  in  Figure  1.  The budget  constraint  exhibits  a kink  at the  point 
where  the country  consumes  its endowment  in each period,  as it would 
do under autarky. The kink results from the iceberg cost which is paid on 
each  way  of the  round  trip when  the  country  exports  the  good  at one 
period and imports it at the other. Trade costs generate a wedge  between 
the world  real interest rate r* and the rate at which  domestic  agents  can 
substitute  their consumption  intertemporally,  r =  (1 + r*)(P/P2) -  1 (the 
"domestic  real interest rate," in OR's words). 
At the  optimum  the representative  consumer's  iso-utility  curve must 
be tangent  to the budget  curve.  If tangency  is reached  at the kink of the 
budget  curve,  as in Figure  1, there is no  international  trade in equilib- 
rium.3 This case arises if the difference  between  the period  1 and period 
2 endowments,  Y1  and Y2,  is not too large. For example,  if u(c) = c'-P/(1 - 
3. Note that in order to solve the model one has to assume that the representative  con- 
sumer  is aware  of the  kink in the  country's  budget  constraint,  i.e.,  takes as given  the 





slope  -(+rC*)1-)- 
Yl  Cl 
p) and the psychological  discount  rate is equal to the world  interest rate 
[13(1  +  r*) =  1], there is no trade provided  that 
Y2 
(1 -  )/P <-<  (1 -  )-2/  (1) 
The no-trade  region  can be pretty  large  for plausible  values  of the  pa- 
rameters. To illustrate,  if utility is logarithmic  and trade costs amount  to 
10% of trade volume  (a very  conservative  estimate  by  OR's standards, 
who  use a figure of 25% in their calibration), there is no trade as long  as 
the difference  between  Y1  and Y2  does  not exceed  20%. 
It is interesting  to note  that these  results  do  not  hinge  on  particular 
assumptions  on the time structure.  The two periods  could be separated 
by one  month  or one  generation.  If the model  had more than two peri- 
ods,  or time were  continuous,  the no-trade  region would  still be charac- 
terized by a condition  like (1). The model predicts that there is no interna- 
tional trade as long as domestic  income  does  not deviate  too much from 
its average level. 
Figure 2 illustrates,  in continuous  time, how  the model can explain the 
low  international  correlation  of  consumption  (the  Feldstein-Horioka 
puzzle).  The figure shows  domestic  consumption  and the trade balance Comment 395 
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for an  arbitrary continuous  time  path  of  domestic  output.  As  long  as 
domestic  output  remains  in  the  no-trade  region,  the  trade balance  is 
equal  to zero  and  the  fluctuations  in consumption  mirror those  of out- 
put.  By  contrast,  consumption  is  completely  smoothed  when  output 
takes  extreme  values  outside  the  no-trade  region.  As  a result,  the  cor- 
relation between  domestic  output  and domestic  consumption  is equal to 
1 in the no-trade  region  and equal to 0 outside.  If output  remains  in the 
no-trade  region  most  of the time,  the  observed  average  correlation will 
be close to 1. This might seem  like a puzzle  to the outside  observer, who 
would  expect  consumption  to be smoothed  all the time,  given  that the 
capital market is perfectly  integrated  internationally  (this is one  way  to 
define  the international-consumption-correlation  puzzle). 
Explaining the Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle  by the same logic requires an 
explicit  consideration  of investment  opportunities  at home  and abroad. 
Assume  for example  that residents  have  access  to domestic  investment 
opportunities  with  decreasing  returns.  If, in the two-period  model,  the 
return on  the  marginal  domestic  investment  remains  between  (1 -  r)2 
and (1 -  T)-2  times the return on investments  abroad, then the represen- 396 *  JEANNE 
tative domestic  agent invests  all his savings  at home,  and domestic  sav- 
ing and investment  behave  in the same way  as under  autarky. Domestic 
saving  will  be perfectly  correlated  with  domestic  investment,  as in the 
Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle. 
2.2 THE  MULTI-GOOD  CASE 
In order to explain  the low correlation of international  consumption  (the 
Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle),  OR need  trade  costs  to  generate  a wedge 
between  the domestic  real interest  rate and the world  real interest  rate. 
In other  words,  they  need  the  instantaneous price  wedge  generated  by 
trade  costs-which  they  use  to explain  the  home  bias  in trade-to  be 
augmented  by an intertemporal  wedge.  As OR's two-good  model  shows, 
this  intertemporal  wedge  can  arise  under  more  complex  goods  struc- 
tures  than  the  one-good  model  I have  just presented,  although  in that 
case the analysis  is more complicated. 
Introducing  a second  good  into  the  model  allows  us  to focus  on  the 
composition  of  the  country's  imports  and  exports.  In OR's  two-good 
model the home and foreign goods  are both exchanged  in global competi- 
tive markets at given prices in terms of foreign currency units.  While the 
foreign  good  is  always  imported,  the  home  good  may  be  exported  or 
imported  in  equilibrium.  Whether  the  home  good  is  imported  or ex- 
ported,  moreover,  is crucial for the model's  ability to produce  a wedge 
between  the domestic  real interest rate and the world  interest  rate. 
As  OR show,  if the  trade balance  involves  a round trip in  the  home 
good-i.e.,  if this  good  is exported  at one  period  and  imported  at the 
other-there  is a wedge  between  the domestic  real interest rate and the 
world  interest  rate.4 In this  case  the  consumption-saving  behavior  of 
domestic  residents  can be analyzed  in the same terms as in the one-good 
model,  the home  good  playing  the  same  role as the single  good  in the 
one-good  model.  By contrast,  if the domestic  country exports  the home 
good  in both  periods,  there is no  wedge  in the  real-interest-rate  parity 
condition,  and  the  intertemporal  current  account  behaves  in the  same 
way, qualitatively,  as in the absence of trade costs.5 Although  trade costs 
distort the relative price of the home  and foreign  goods  in each period, 
they  do  not  change  the  intertemporal  rate of substitution  of home  con- 
sumption  between  period  1 and period 2. 
This raises the question  of the robustness  of OR's explanation  for the 
Felstein-Horioka  puzzle  to changes  in the  underlying  assumptions  on 
the goods  structure.  In particular, it would  be interesting  to explore how 
easily  the  logic  of  OR's  argument  can  be  transposed  to  a framework 
4. The  round-trip  case  corresponds  to segments  I and  V of  the  curve  in  OR's Figure  1. 
5. This case corresponds  to segment  III of the curve in OR's Figure 1. Comment  *  397 
where  international  trade involves  differentiated  goods.  The transposi- 
tion  is not  trivial, because  trade  in differentiated  goods  cannot  exhibit 
the  round  trips which  seem  to play  a role in OR's results.  While a car- 
producing  country may have  a trade deficit or a trade surplus  in cars at 
any given  period,  it is impossible  by construction  for this country's  trade 
balance  to  exhibit  a round  trip  in  any  of  the  differentiated  goods,  or 
brands,  that  compose  the  composite  good  "car." France,  say,  always 
exports Renaults and always  imports Fords or Volkswagens. 
Generalizing  OR's model  to differentiated  goods  would  also enhance 
its empirical relevance.  It is well  known  that most  of the trade between 
industrial  countries  involves  differentiated  goods.  This stylized  fact has 
been  widely  documented  in the  literature on international  trade under 
imperfect competition,  for which  it provided  the founding  motivation.  It 
would  be  important  to  understand  how  the  logic  of  OR's  argument 
applies  to this case, since it is precisely  for developed  economies  that the 
Felstein-Horioka  puzzle  and the international-consumption-correlation 
puzzle  are most  puzzling  (for less  developed  economies  other  factors, 
such as country  risk, can be invoked,  as OR note). 
2.3 A LOOK  AT  THE  DATA 
Although  it remains  to be seen  whether  OR's analysis  is robust to mo- 
nopolistic  competition,  their  assumptions  seem  plausible  for  interna- 
tional trade in raw commodities,  which  are generally  exchanged  in very 
competitive  markets.  Their model  predicts  that because  of trade costs, 
we  should  observe  few  round  trips in raw commodities.  Is this predic- 
tion borne out by the data? Table 1 provides  evidence  on the occurrence 
of round  trips for a sample  of ten countries  and five raw commodities. 
The table is constructed  using  the United  Nations  annual trade data set 
over the period  1988-1998.  The + (-)  sign indicates  that the country has 
been  an exporter  (importer)  of the  commodity  over  the  whole  period, 
i.e.,  every single year from 1988 to 1998. The sign  + indicates that at least 
one  round  trip (change  in the sign  of the trade balance in the commod- 
ity) has been  observed. 
The results reported in Table 1 are consistent  with  the model's  predic- 
tion.  Of the  42 country-commodity  pairs for which  data are available, 
almost  90% do  not  show  any  round  trip.  This  finding  could  be  inter- 
preted  as  evidence  in  favor  of  OR's  hypothesis  that  round  trips  are 
discouraged  by  trade costs.  However,  it could  also  reflect the  fact that 
trade in primary commodities  is driven by comparative  advantage,  not 
by  intertemporal  consumption  smoothing.  In a world  where  compara- 
tive  advantage  is the  driving  force,  we  would  observe  very  few  round 
trips even  in the absence  of trade costs. 398 *  JEANNE 
Table 1  ROUND TRIPS  IN RAW  COMMODITIES  (1988-1998) 
Natural  Iron  Crude  Natural 
Country  Wheat  rubber  ore  petroleum  gas 
Australia  +  -  +  +  + 
France  +  -  - 
Germany  + 
Indonesia  NA  +  NA  +  + 
Italy  -  -  -  -  + 
Japan  NA  -  -  NA 
New Zealand  -  NA  +  -  NA 
Turkey  +  -  NA  -NA 
U.K.  +  -  -  + 
U.S.  +  -  - 
Source:  United Nations;  annual data 1988-1998.  The SITC  codes of the commodities  are:  041 (wheat- 
including  spelt-and  meslin, unmiled); 231  (natural  rubber  and similar  natural  gums);  281  (iron  ore and 
concentrates);  333  (petroleum  oils and oils obtained  from  bituminous  minerals,  crude);  343 (natural  gas, 
whether  or not liquefied).  The observation  for  a given country  was treated  as not available  if three  years 
or more of the corresponding  annual  data were not available  in the UN data  set. I initially  considered  a 
sample of 17 countries,  and then excluded  the 6 countries  for which data  were not available  for at least 
three  commodities. 
3.  The  Exchange-Rate  Disconnect  Puzzle 
OR present very stimulating  developments  on exchange-rate excess vola- 
tility and  what  they  call the  exchange-rate  disconnect. Their point  can be 
loosely  summarized  as follows:  because  of the combination  of nominal 
stickiness  and pricing to market at the level  of the domestic  consumers, 
the  exchange  rate matters  very  little  for anything  real in the  domestic 
economy  (at least in the short run), so that it can wander  around under 
the impact of small shocks.  OR's "disconnect"  is between  the exchange- 
rate and goods  markets. 
OR's point  is related  to an old  question  in exchange-rate  economics: 
Should  one view  exchange  rates primarily as asset prices or primarily as 
the  determinants  of  relative  prices  in  goods  markets?  Of  course  they 
are both  to some  extent,  and one  way  to view  the history  of exchange- 
rate  theory-from  its  early  developments  to  the  "new  open  macro- 
economics"-is  as a long struggle  to integrate both aspects of exchange- 
rate  determination  in  a  coherent  framework.  The  substance  of  the 
question,  however,  was in the adverb primarily.  To rephrase the question: 
Is it practically more relevant to think of exchange  rates as asset prices, or 
as determinants  of relative  prices  in the markets for goods-if,  leaving 
general equilibrium  aside,  one  had  to choose  between  the two  views?  I 
interpret  OR's  "exchange-rate  disconnect"  as  the  idea  that  exchange Comment 399 
rates matter so  little for relative  prices  that they  can best  be viewed  as 
asset prices-at  least to a first approximation. 
3.1 A MODEL 
A  model  can help  us  to better  understand  the  link between  the  trade 
costs  and  exchange-rate  volatility.  I consider  a monetary  extension  of 
the two-period  one-good  model  discussed  in the previous  section.  The 
log-linearized  version  of the  model  is given  by the  following  set  (S) of 
equations: 
mt -  Pt =  ct,  t =  1,2,  (LM) 
1 
cl  =  --[il-(Pe2-  P1)  +  c2,  (IS) 
p 
Y1  = (oP1,  2 = o,  (PC) 
cl + C2  = Yl + Y2,  (BC) 
il =  e -  sl,  (IP) 
Pt =  St,  t =  1,2  (LOP) 
The  model  is written  assuming  no  trade  costs  (introduced  later).  The 
domestic  country  issues  its  own  currency,  and  nominal  variables  now 
refer to prices in terms of the domestic  currency. The first equation  is an 
interest-inelastic  money  demand  equation  of the type implied by a cash- 
in-advance  constraint.  The  second  equation  is  the  Euler equation  for 
consumption,  sometimes  called the "new Keynesian"  IS curve. The fol- 
lowing  equations  are Phillips  curves  where,  viewed  from period  1, the 
nominal  wage  is sticky  in period  1 but  flexible  in period  2. The fourth 
equation  is the country's  intertemporal budget  constraint (linearized un- 
der the assumption  that Y1  and Y2  are very close and that the world  real 
interest rate, r*, is equal to zero). The fifth equation  is the interest parity 
condition  (reflecting the perfect integration  of the capital account).  And 
the last equations  correspond  to the law of one price at periods  1 and 2, 
resulting  from the assumption  that there are no trade costs.  The exoge- 
nous  policy  variables  are the log  deviations  in domestic  money  supply, 
ml and m,  which  are both  assumed  to be stochastic.  For convenience  I 
assume  that the values  of ml and m2  are revealed  at period 1, so that there 
is no uncertainty  about future money  supply  or any other variable when 
the first-period  exchange  rate is determined.6 
Let us  look  at the  following  question:  How  does  the  variance  of the 
exchange  rate in period  1, Var(sl), depend  on the level  of trade costs,  Tr? 
To simplify  the analysis  I compare two extreme cases: perfect trade inte- 
6. This explains  why the risk premium  can be ignored in the interest  parity  condition. 400  JEANNE 
gration  (r1 =  0) and  complete  disintegration  (r1 =  +oo). In both  cases 
trade costs  are assumed  to be zero in period  2 (I discuss  below  the case 
where  r2  is non-zero). 
First let us consider  the case of perfect trade integration.  Then the law 
of one price applies  at period  1, i.e., 
sl = Pi  (2) 
It follows  from  interest  parity  and  the  Euler  condition  that  expected 
consumption  is equal to current consumption  (c2 = cI). Taking the expec- 
tation of the budget  constraint then gives  cl = yi/2, i.e.,  half of the change 
in  current  disposable  income  is  consumed  in  period  1,  the  other  half 
being  saved  for  consumption  in  period  2.  The  money-demand  and 
Phillips-curve  equations  finally give an expression  for the exchange  rate: 
ml 
Si =  ?  (3) 
1 +  ar/2 
If the nominal  wage  is flexible  at period  1 (or =  0), the exchange  rate is 
proportional  to the  money  supply.  In the  presence  of nominal  rigidity 
the  impact  of  money  supply  on  the  exchange  rate  is  damped  by  the 
accommodating  response  of output. 
Let  us  now  consider  the  case  where  the  international  exchange  of 
good  is prevented  in period  1 by infinite trade costs (r1 =  +oo). Then the 
law of one  price no longer  holds  at period  1 and domestic  consumption 
is  equal  to  domestic  output  in both  periods:  cl  =  y,  and  c  =  y'  =  0. 
Taking the  expectation  of money  demand  at period  2 gives  s2  =  m2, so 
that the nominal  exchange  rate at period  1 must satisfy 
1 
= 
m2  -  ii.  (4) 
Simple  manipulations  of the remaining  equations  then  give  the follow- 
ing reduced-form  expression  for the exchange  rate: 
1 + po- 
s1  -  m,.  (5) 
Comparing  equations  (2) and  (4) brings  out  the  implication  of  trade 
costs  for the  determination  of  the  exchange  rate in  this  model.  In the 
absence  of  trade  costs  the  exchange  rate  is  determined  in  the  goods 
market: Equation (2) is an arbitrage condition  between  the domestic  and Comment 401 
the  foreign  price  of  the  good.  By  contrast,  in  the  presence  of  (high 
enough)  trade costs,  the  exchange  rate is determined  in the  asset  mar- 
ket.  Equation  (4) is  an  arbitrage condition  between  domestic  currency 
and  foreign  currency  bonds.  In this  simple  setup,  infinite  trade  costs 
produce  a complete  exchange-rate  disconnect  at period  1 (in the  sense 
that the exchange  rate has no direct connection  with  domestic  output  or 
the domestic  price level),  and as a result,  the equation  for the exchange 
rate becomes  a pure asset-pricing  equation.7 
3.2 CAN THE  EXCHANGE-RATE  DISCONNECT  EXPLAIN 
EXCESSIVE  EXCHANGE-RATE VOLATILITY? 
Does  the exchange  rate become  more volatile  as a result of trade costs? 
Comparing  equation  (3) and equation  (5) shows  that the answer is yes if, 
and only if, (1 + po-)/(l +  r-)  >  1/(1 +  o-/2), i.e., 
1 
p >  +  (6) 
High  trade  costs  increase  exchange-rate  volatility  if  the  intertemporal 
substitutability  of  consumption,  l/p,  is  low  enough.  This is because  a 
lower  intertemporal  substitutability  of consumption  makes  the  interest 
rate-and  so  the  exchange  rate,  when  it  is  determined  as  an  asset 
price-more  volatile. 
There is another sense  in which  trade costs can generate  an exchange- 
rate disconnect  in this model.  If international  trade involves  a cost not 
only at period 1 but also at period 2 (T2  t  0), then the nominal exchange may 
become  indeterminate  in both periods  over some  range of parameter val- 
ues.  This point  is extremely  easy to see in the extreme case where  trade 
costs  are infinite  in both periods.  Then the law of one  price is removed 
from the  set  of equations  (S) and  there is nothing  to pin  down  the ex- 
change  rate. Indeterminacy  can be a significant  cause  of volatility  if the 
exchange  rate fluctuates  widely  in the range of indeterminacy,  under the 
influence  of market sentiments  and other nonfundamental  factors.8 
7. The asset market  is in equilibrium,  and the.interest  parity condition  holds, irrespective 
of trade costs. Under the exchange-rate  disconnect,  however, the interest  parity  condi- 
tion endogenizes the exchange rate after the nominal interest rate has been solved for 
using the other equations. Under perfect trade integration  it endogenizes the nominal 
interest  rate after  the exchange  rate. 
8. The intuition  behind the exchange-rate  indeterminacy  can be conveyed by the following 
parable.  Assume that humans come into contact  with an extraterrestrial  civilization  with 
which telecommunications  are easy, but the exchange of goods is ruled out forever 
because of the enormous  distance  between them and us. Assume that in a misconceived 
attempt  to extend the reach  of liberal  capitalism  to outer space, an electronic  market  for 
the exchange of extraterrestrial  and terrestrial  currencies  and nominal bonds is estab- 402  JEANNE 
The  notion  that  exchange  rates  can be  indeterminate,  and  that  this 
indeterminacy  could  generate  excess  volatility, is not new.9 From a theo- 
retical point of view,  moreover,  indeterminacy  is a rather brittle property 
of this model.  It hinges  on a complete  and permanent  absence of interna- 
tional trade. The certainty that countries will exchange  at least one good, 
even  in  the  distant  future  and  in very  small  quantities,  suffices  to pin 
down  the exchange  rate-making  indeterminacy  an unconvincing  expla- 
nation  for  excess  exchange-rate  volatility  in  a  world  where  countries 
routinely trade with each other. Still the model may have some pedagogi- 
cal value,  if only to make the point that although  their short-run dynam- 
ics  may  obey  the  rules  of  asset  pricing,  exchange  rates  are ultimately 
pinned  down  by international  trade in goods. 
Another  question  is the extent  to which  the exchange-rate  disconnect 
makes  the  high  volatility  of  exchange  rates  observed  in  the  data  less 
puzzling.  This is not  entirely  clear to me.  The only  substantial  implica- 
tion  of  the  exchange-rate  disconnect  for  exchange-rate  volatility,  if  I 
understand  OR correctly, is that the volatility  of exchange  rates should 
be  thought  of in the  same  way  as the  price volatility  of other  assets.10 
The asset perspective,  however,  is precisely  the one adopted  by most  of 
the  empirical  literature on  the excess  volatility  of exchange  rates.ll  The 
exchange-rate  disconnect,  then,  just  leaves  us  with  the  more  general 
question:  why  are asset  prices  so  volatile?  Answering  this  question  is 
likely  to  require  departures  from  key  assumptions  (such  as  common 
knowledge  or rational expectations)  on which  most  exchange-rate  mod- 
els,  including  those  in this paper, are based. 
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1. Introduction 
Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  have  once  again  written  an important  paper  that 
undoubtedly  will be highly  influential  in developing  our understanding 
of  many  of  the  major puzzles  in  international  macroeconomics.  They 
highlight  the fact that goods  markets for consumers  appear to be very far 
from being  perfectly  integrated,  and  show  how  this  imperfection  can 
help  provide  a unified  understanding  of the  puzzles  that have  eluded 
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as OR hereinafter)  provide  us with  models  that make  sense  at an intu- 
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from  costs  of  trade,  with  previous  studies  that  have  found  that 
trade costs do not get us very far? 
(b)  Does  the solution  proposed  by OR solve  the puzzles  at the expense 
of introducing  new  puzzles?  That is, does their solution  have coun- 
terfactual implications  for other economic  relationships?  (The prime 
example  of what  I have  in mind  here is what  OR call the "Backus- 
Smith puzzle.") 
(c)  Some of the problems  connected  with points  (a) and (b) can be recti- 
fied by moving  away  from the  assumption  of complete  asset  mar- 
kets.  But, then,  how  do we  assess  how  much  of the solution  to the 
puzzle  is coming  from trade costs vs.  capital-market imperfections? 
In reviewing  some of the existing  literature, it appears to me that trade 
frictions alone do not explain the puzzles.  While they move  things in the 
right  direction,  quantitatively  goods  frictions  are insufficient.  OR pro- 
vide  us with extraordinary intuition  for why  goods  markets move  things 
in  the  right  direction,  but  we  need  more  study  to be  able  to reconcile 
their compelling  but  simplified  examples  with  the  results  that  emerge 
from simulation  of more fully specified  dynamic models.  This very much 
reminds  me  of  the  literature  on  one  puzzle  that  OR  do  not  try  to 
resolve-the  forward-premium  puzzle.  There, the easy explanation  that 
was proposed  is that a foreign-exchange  risk premium  can lead to biased 
forecasts of the forward premium.  But when  researchers  tried to embed 
risk premiums  into calibrated equilibrium  models  and assess  the size  of 
that effect, they found  that the risk premium was far too small to explain 
the  magnitude  of  the  deviations  from  uncovered  interest  parity.  The 
parallel  is  that  the  literature  so  far has  not  found  that  goods-market 
imperfections  alone can quantitatively  explain  the OR puzzles. 
There is another  parallel with  the literature on the forward-premium 
puzzle.  When  researchers finally were  able to construct models  that got 
close  to  matching  the  magnitude  and  sign  of  the  deviation  from  un- 
covered  interest parity, they found  that their models  had a very unpleas- 
ant implication  about the moments  of another variable.  In that case,  the 
problem  was  that  the  models  implied  nominal-interest-rate  volatility 
that was  much  greater than what  is found  in the data. The parallel here 
is  that  the  models  that  OR  propose  imply  a high  correlation  of  real 
exchange  rates  with  relative  consumption  levels  across  countries.  OR 
call this the "Backus-Smith"  problem. They appear to dismiss  this issue, 
but in doing  so leave me puzzled  as to how  we can reconcile the implica- 
tions of their approach with  the data. 
My comments  will  focus  on  puzzles  2-4  of OR (which  I call the  core 
puzzles): the  Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle,  the  home-bias-in-equity-port- Comment 405 
folios  puzzle,  and  the  international-consumption-correlations  puzzle. 
These  three  puzzles  are linked  in that they  can best  be  understood  as 
pointing  toward  a surprising  lack of risk sharing internationally.  I com- 
ment only briefly on the other three puzzles. 
To reiterate, I do think  that costs  of trade are fundamental  in under- 
standing  these  puzzles.  Capital-market  imperfections  alone  are not  the 
answer.  OR provide  new  insight  into how  trade costs  can help  resolve 
the puzzles,  and should  help  to focus  future research endeavors  in this 
promising  direction. 
2.  The  Core  Puzzles 
To my tastes,  the clearest way  to demonstrate  the claim that trade costs 
alone  can explain  the  core puzzles  would  be to use  the model  of com- 
plete  asset  markets and no  trade frictions  as the benchmark,  and show 
how  far trade  costs  get  us.  For example,  the  home-bias-in-portfolios 
puzzle  is no  puzzle  at all if the  null  model  is  one  in which  there  are 
restrictions  on asset trade or missing  asset markets. 
Let me  briefly  review  the  three  core puzzles  to help  clarify. We find 
very  low  correlations  of consumption  internationally.  That is puzzling 
because  it seems  to imply that there is very little sharing of idiosyncratic 
shocks  to income.  To me  (and to OR) the puzzle  is not  that there is an 
absence  of complete  risk sharing.  The puzzle  is that there appears  to be 
so  little risk sharing-much  less  than we  would  expect  given  the wide 
array of  assets  that  allow  us  to  hedge  risk.  But how  can  we  measure 
the  ability of trade costs  to explain  the  low  correlation  of consumption 
levels?  The natural way  to me  (and apparently  to OR) is to assess  the 
effects  of introducing  trade costs into a model  with  complete  asset mar- 
kets.  We know  that the free-trade, complete-markets  model  implies  per- 
fect  correlation-so  how  far does  that  correlation  fall when  there  are 
plausible  trade costs? 
Home  bias  in  portfolios  is  puzzling  at  an  intuitive  level.  Investors 
could  more  effectively  hedge  risk by  balancing  their portfolios  among 
assets  from countries  around the globe.  Diversification  is the fundamen- 
tal principle of risk management.  Again,  however,  it is helpful  to have  a 
benchmark  to assess  the effects of trade costs.  In general,  full diversifica- 
tion of equity  holdings  does  not  achieve  complete  risk sharing,  but OR 
quite  naturally  focus  on  special  models  where  that  does  occur.  This 
special  case  is  appealing  because  it  gives  us  a  simple  benchmark  to 
compare  the  effects  of  market  imperfections  against.  Furthermore,  as 
OR show  in this paper (and in their 1996 textbook),  "for realistic parame- 
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complete-markets  consumption  allocation,  so that the home bias evident 
under complete  markets is a good  guide  to the home bias in an equities- 
only model." 
The  Feldstein-Horioka  paradox  has  been  a hard  one  to  pin  down. 
Why is the finding  of low correlation of saving  and investment  a puzzle? 
OR's (1996) textbook  has,  for my tastes,  the clearest  explanation  of the 
puzzle.  In a Walrasian model  with  no trade barriers and complete  asset 
markets, the amount  of investment  in a country's  capital stock should  be 
independent  of the parameters  that determine  the  country's  consump- 
tion level.  The simplest  way  to see  this is to think of the special  cases in 
which  a diversified  portfolio  of  equities  mimics  complete  markets.  In 
that case,  the  firm's decision  to add  to capital must  be independent  of 
the  consumption  choices  of  the  individuals  who  live  in  the  country 
where  the firm produces.  The firm is owned  globally, so why  would  the 
consumption  or saving  decisions  of the  residents  of the country  where 
the firm is located have any special influence  on its investment  decision? 
So,  again,  a natural  benchmark  to  compare  the  effects  of  trade  costs 
alone is the free-trade,  complete-markets  Walrasian model. 
3.  The  Literature 
There are two reasons  why  I emphasize  that the complete-asset-markets 
model  is a natural benchmark.  First, there actually exists a literature that 
looks  into  trade costs  as an explanation  for these  puzzles.  Using  com- 
plete  markets  as the benchmark,  introducing  trade costs  alone  does  not 
appear to get us very  far in resolving  the puzzles.  The second  reason  I 
emphasize  it is that while  OR naturally  gravitate  toward  the complete- 
markets model  as a benchmark,  in several  instances  they  subsequently 
inveigh  against  that model  on  the  grounds  essentially  that in the  real 
world  markets are not complete.  True, but the complete-markets  model 
is a useful  benchmark.  I address  the literature in this section.  In Section 
5, I return to the benchmark  issue. 
The  careful  reader  might  have  noticed  footnote  2  in  OR.  It makes 
reference  to Backus, Kehoe,  and Kydland  (1992), which  is the piece  that 
brought  the consumption  correlation  puzzle  to the attention  of the pro- 
fession.  That paper  actually  devotes  an  entire  section  to  whether  the 
introduction  of trade costs of precisely  the type OR propose  can explain 
the  consumption  correlation  puzzle.  Their  model  is  a  fairly  detailed 
Walrasian, complete-markets  model.  They  can assess  directly the effect 
of trade costs on consumption  correlations.  And they find that the intro- 
duction  of trade costs  into their model  actually makes  the consumption Comment 407 
correlation  puzzle  worse,  not better.  Further investigation  by the same 
authors in a subsequent  study  using  alternative  specifications  of trading 
costs  (Backus, Kydland,  and Kehoe 1995) confirms that the consumption 
correlation puzzle  is not solved  by trading costs. 
In fact, however,  the  Feldstein-Horioka  problem  is partly explained 
by  Backus,  Kydland,  and  Kehoe  when  trading  costs  are  introduced. 
And,  as OR note in footnote  25, one can interpret some of their results as 
supporting  the  contention  that  moderate  transportation  costs  help  re- 
solve  the home-bias-in-equities  puzzle.  However,  this illustrates  where 
we  need  to  go  with  the  observations  of OR.  Does  the  solution  to one 
puzzle  make things  worse  for the others? When  Backus, Kydland,  and 
Kehoe build a benchmark complete-markets  free-trade Walrasian model, 
they find that introducing  trade costs helps  in some  dimensions  but not 
others.  And,  as I shall discuss  in the next section,  there are some  other 
dimensions  along which  the trade costs make things  much worse. 
I agree with  OR that the  dichotomy  in many  papers  between  traded 
goods  and  nontraded  goods  is not  a useful  one.  As  they  say, we  can 
probably  think  of all consumer  goods  as having  a nontradable  compo- 
nent.  The problems  they  discuss  in Sections  6.2-6.5  ought  to be at the 
core of what  we  do  research  on  in international  macroeconomics.  But, 
still, one  wonders  whether  the literature in which  nontraded  goods  are 
introduced  as an explanation  for these  puzzles  might be instructive  as to 
how  far trade costs will get us.  By and large, the nontraded-goods  mod- 
els have  not been  particularly useful  in resolving  these  puzzles.  OR do 
provide  a  helpful  description  of  the  shortcomings  of  the  nontraded- 
goods  model  with  the portfolio  diversification  paradox,  and show  how 
trade costs might  get us further. But what  about the other core puzzles? 
And what  about the Backus-Smith  paradox? 
4.  Other  Variables 
As  OR note  in equation  (15), the  complete-markets  models  they  intro- 
duce  imply  perfect correlation of the log of relative  consumption  levels 
internationally  with  real exchange  rates.  Backus and Smith  (1993) were 
the first to derive  this implication  in a model  with  trade imperfections. 
(Theirs was a model with nontraded  goods.)  But the condition  arises in a 
wide  variety of contexts  in which  the law of one price fails. 
The problem is that in the data there is virtually no correlation between 
relative  consumption  levels  and real exchange  rates. Backus and Smith 
document  this  in  a fairly simple  way  for G7 countries.  But Kollmann 
(1995) and  Ravn (2000) thoroughly  demolish  the  notion  that these  two 408  ENGEL 
variables  are connected.  Kollman  shows  that,  generally  for  advanced 
countries,  real exchange  rates  and  relative  consumption  levels  are not 
cointegrated  and that there is no discernible  short-run relationship. 
Of course,  models  sometimes  have  ancillary implications  that are not 
supported  by  the  data but  are not  critical to  the  issue  of  interest.  But 
here,  the implication  is central to the resolution  of the puzzles.  In the OR 
models  of this paper,  trade costs lead  to deviations  from the law of one 
price, and deviations  from the law of one price are the sole reason for the 
failure of purchasing-power  parity. The changes  in the real exchange  rate 
that are generated  are, in turn,  what break the  link between  consump- 
tion  levels  across countries.  That is,  it is precisely  the nonconstancy  of 
real exchange  rates  in  their  models  that  explains  why  there  does  not 
appear to be a great deal of risk sharing. 
My sense  is that it is knowledge  of the  empirical  findings  of Backus 
and  Smith  (1993) and  Kollmann  (1995) that has  convinced  researchers 
that trade costs  per se,  or more  generally  models  with  law-of-one-price 
deviations,  are not the sole solution  to these riddles.  Perhaps researchers 
should  not have been  scared away  from this avenue,  but OR do little to 
help  us  out  on  this  problem.  They  say  that  "Trade costs  would  play 
essentially  the same role in a world with,  say, trade in debt and equities 
but not  a complete  set of Arrow-Debreu  securities."  That may be true, 
but  it needs  to be  demonstrated.  Can trade costs  play  a quantitatively 
significant  role in resolving  the puzzles  in such  a model?  At this stage, 
this  seems  not  much  more  than  a conjecture.  The models  that are pre- 
sented  in this  paper  all have  the  implication  that relative  consumption 
levels  are perfectly  correlated with  real exchange  rates.  OR provide  us 
with  no evidence  about models  in which  this link is broken. 
It is also a bit disconcerting  that OR focus  exclusively  on the implica- 
tions of their models  for the puzzles  that the model  is meant to address, 
and not on other implications  of the model.  The type of discipline  that we 
rightly demand from the purveyors  of general equilibrium Walrasian mod- 
els (that is, the RBCers) is that they show  us that the models  can explain 
moments  of some variables without  generating unreasonable  correlations 
among  other  variables.  For example,  would  the OR models  with  trade 
costs  imply  negative  correlation of inputs,  such  as arise in many  of the 
RBC models  (with and without  trade frictions or nontraded  goods)? 
5.  The  Benchmark 
OR seem  to shrug  off the Backus-Smith  puzzle:  "We do not take this as 
damning,  since  for  us  the  complete-markets  assumption  was  only  a 
useful  device  for calibration, and not a conviction."  Of course that is true Comment 409 
for me too.  But, where  are we  left? Apparently  we need  to concede  that 
there is some  deviation  from complete  markets to be able to accommo- 
date  the  Backus-Smith  problem.  How  far from  completeness  do  they 
have  to be?  At  what  point  have  we  stepped  over  the  line  and  made 
capital-market  imperfections  part  of  the  solution  to  the  problem?  In 
short,  how  can OR say that we  can solve  these  riddles  "without  appeal- 
ing to capital-market imperfections"? 
6.  The  Other  Puzzles 
Let me briefly comment  on some of the other issues  raised by OR. First, I 
am not convinced  that allowing  for high  elasticities  of substitution  goes 
that far in solving  the  home-bias-in-trade  puzzle.  There are small  fric- 
tions in within-country  trade as well,  and one would  suspect  that goods 
produced  within  a country's  borders  are even  closer  substitutes  than 
internationally  traded  goods.  Yet, the  small  intranational  trading  costs 
do not seem  to impose  much  of a barrier to intranational trade. Indeed, 
the  revised  version  of  Evans  (2000) concludes  that the  story  in which 
"high border effects arise almost entirely from high elasticities  of substi- 
tution  provides  at best a partial explanation"  of the home  bias in trade. 
The  misleading  thing  about  the  OR examples  in  this  regard  is  that 
there are no intranational  frictions in trade. So they  tell us that 0.25 is a 
modest  value  for proportional  international  trade  costs,  but  implicitly 
assume  that 0 is a modest  value  of intranational trade costs.  It is easy to 
set up a model  parallel to the one  described  in equations  (1)-(6)  of OR, 
but with two regions within  each of two countries.  Consider their calibra- 
tion,  allowing  the  elasticity  of substitution  intranationally  and  interna- 
tionally to be equal to 6, but introduce within-country  trade costs of 0.10. 
Then the ratio of intranational  trade to international  trade in the model 
falls to 2.5. If, in addition,  one allows the intranational elasticity of substi- 
tution  to be greater than the international  elasticity  (equal to 12 instead 
of 6), the trade-costs  model  goes  only a small way toward explaining  the 
home  trade bias.  The ratio of international  to within-country  trade ex- 
plained  by the model  is merely  1.3. 
I found OR's discussion  of the final two puzzles  engaging  and stimulat- 
ing.  Let me  make  just  two  comments.  First, I think  even  in  trying  to 
explain exchange-rate  volatility it might turn out that we need  more than 
just  goods-market  imperfections.  Here  is  why  I make  this  conjecture. 
Betts  and  Devereux  (1996)  consider  exchange-rate  volatility  in  which 
consumer  goods  markets are completely  segmented  and the law of one 
price fails. In their static model,  indeed  they find exchange-rate  volatility 
is much  larger (6 times larger) than a parallel model  in which  the law of 410  ENGEL 
one  price and PPP hold.  But when  they  move  to a dynamic  model  with 
capital mobility  (Betts and Devereux,  2000), the volatility  effect is much 
smaller.  The  exchange-rate  variance  is  only  1.7  times  larger  in  the 
segmented-markets  model  than in the model with integrated  goods  mar- 
ket. OR's intuition is that the goods-market  frictions modify the dampen- 
ing  effect  that capital markets have  on exchange-rate  fluctuations.  But, 
in a dynamic  setting,  Betts and Devereux's  results suggest  that the modi- 
fication may not be large. 
The second  comment  is that I think it is a mistake to link the exchange- 
rate disconnect  puzzle  with  exchange-rate  volatility. One way of putting 
it is  that  the  exchange-rate  disconnect  puzzle  is  about  why  exchange 
rates are not  correlated with  fundamentals.  It is a puzzle  about correla- 
tions,  not variances.  In other words,  I believe  the case that OR are trying 
to make is that unobserved  shocks might have a large effect on exchange 
rates  if exchange  rates  are highly  volatile.  But observed  shocks  in the 
money  supply  and other fundamentals  also should  have large effects.  It 
is not immediately  clear that high volatility in the exchange  rate implies  a 
weak  link between  the exchange  rate and fundamentals  (which  is what 
the exchange-rate  disconnect  puzzle  is all about). 
7. Concluding  Comments 
I think there may be a close  link between  the type of goods-market  fric- 
tions OR describe and possible  failures in the capital markets. Because the 
discipline  imposed  by goods  markets on the equilibrium exchange  rate is 
so weak,  there may be more room (particularly in the short run) for noise 
in exchange  rates. That is,  "chartists" as in Frankel and Froot (1990), or 
noise  traders as in Jeanne and Rose  (1999), or order flow  from foreign- 
exchange  traders as in Evans and Lyons  (1999), might  influence  the ex- 
change  rate in the short run because  misalignments  in the exchange  rate 
do  not  provoke  a large  immediate  response  from  the  real side  of  the 
economy.  OR may be hinting  at this in their Section 6.7 (or they may not 
be).  I think  this  is  a promising  avenue  to  explore  to  help  understand 
exchange-rate  volatility  and the disconnect  between  exchange  rates and 
fundamentals.  But it will require formal modeling  and testing. 
While  it  may  seem  that  I am  very  skeptical  of  the  ideas  OR  have 
presented  here,  I am not.  My hunch  is that their view  and mine on these 
issues  are very close  (at least compared  to the huge  lack of consensus  in 
international  macroeconomics).  I am more  cautious  than OR about  the 
degree  to  which  trade  costs  alone  have  solved  the  puzzles.  But  this 
difference  in tone  probably  mostly  reflects  the  differing  roles  of paper 
writers and paper discussants. Discussion  ?411 
One final thought: it may be that over the next 50 years or so, interna- 
tional  goods  markets  will  become  much  more  integrated  and  efficient 
through cyberspace,  making the types  of goods-market  frictions that OR 
discuss  less  important  over time.  By the time we  have  built the models 
that explain  the puzzles,  the  models  and the puzzles  may be  obsolete. 
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Discussion 
Responding  to the discussants,  Ken Rogoff noted  that they had chosen 
simple  examples  to  illustrate  their  main  points  but  that  the  results 
would  survive  generalization.  For example,  it would  not be difficult to 
add  nominal  rigidities  or a sharp  distinction  between  traded  and non- 
traded  goods  to most  of the  examples-although,  he  noted,  to get  the 
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One final thought: it may be that over the next 50 years or so, interna- 
tional  goods  markets  will  become  much  more  integrated  and  efficient 
through cyberspace,  making the types  of goods-market  frictions that OR 
discuss  less  important  over time.  By the time we  have  built the models 
that explain  the puzzles,  the  models  and the puzzles  may be  obsolete. 
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same  results  as  with  moderate  trade  costs,  it  might  be  necessary  to 
assume  that a very large fraction of goods  are nontraded. 
Michael Klein observed  that trading costs,  broadly construed,  seem  to 
be declining  over time, which  should  imply that some  of the puzzles  are 
becoming  less  pronounced.  Maury Obstfeld  agreed  and cited results  in 
the  literature  to the  effect  that home  biases  in asset  holdings  and  con- 
sumption  have  become  smaller  recently.  Valerie Ramey  suggested  that 
immigration  patterns  and  policies  may  affect  trading  costs,  as  immi- 
grants are often  effective  middlemen  for trade between  their country  of 
origin and their current residence.  Richard Portes agreed with discussant 
Charles  Engel  that  a  full  explanation  of  asset-market  puzzles  would 
require  asset-market  as  well  as  goods-market  imperfections,  such  as 
asymmetric  information. 
Alberto Alesina  asked how  broadly trade costs should  be defined.  For 
example,  do  they  include  costs  arising  from  different  currencies,  lan- 
guages,  and  legal  systems?  Obstfeld  said  that  they  were  comfortable 
with  a quite broad interpretation  of trade costs.  Alesina  also noted  that 
the number of countries in the world is rising, which  is a negative  devel- 
opment  if cross-border  costs  are high.  Obstfeld  replied  that Alesina's 
own  work  suggests  that countries  are proliferating  in part because  na- 
tional  independence  confers  greater  flexibility  in  establishing  trading 
and other economic  relationships;  so perhaps  this is not a concern. 
Allan  Drazen  objected to the use  of iceberg costs  on the grounds  that 
the most important effects empirically  are not distance effects but border 
effects.  Further, many  trading  costs  are not  exogenous  but are endoge- 
nously  chosen,  e.g.,  trade  barriers.  He  suggested  that  European  eco- 
nomic  integration  provides  an excellent  test case to study  the effects  of 
falling  trade costs.  Obstfeld  agreed  that border-related  trade  costs  are 
quite important; the decision  to use iceberg costs was based primarily on 
considerations  of tractability. 
John Leahy  expressed  the  concern  that  the  effects  identified  in  this 
paper  might  turn  out  to  be  quantitatively  small  in  a realistically  cali- 
brated model.  The authors agreed that more work needed  to be done  to 
flesh out their story but noted  that their model  differs in important ways 
from those  previously  studied  in the literature. 